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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
INSTITUTIONAL LENDING MODELS, MISSION DRIFT,  
AND MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
In the economic development community, microfinance is a tool used to reduce 
poverty among extremely poor households. Impoverished households can access banking 
services such as credit, savings, and insurance through microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
which can be used to create a new business, smooth household consumption, fund 
medical emergencies, etc. With this basic institutional objective in mind, much of the 
literature surrounding microbanking services is pointing to a drift in the mission of MFIs 
from providing credit to extremely poor households (welfarist approach) to one centered 
on creating a sustainable financial institution that serve the subsistence poor 
(institutionalist approach) within MFIs.  
 
Using MIXMarket data on specific MFIs (n = 2,251) in developing and transition 
economies (n = 118) between 1995 and 2011, a comparison of outreach measures 
(average loan balance) and sustainability (organizational efficiency) of these institutions 
by charter type will be performed through a series of four, fixed effects regression 
models. The main research question is: given that a positive, overall shift in average loan 
balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact microfinance 
institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive margins? 
These analyses will test the theory that MFIs with larger average loan balances serve 
households closer to the subsistence poverty level, as opposed to the core poor, which 
manifests as mission drift toward the institutionalist philosophy of lending.  
 
The phenomenon of mission drift directly impacts the outcomes of microfinance 
institutions which is linked to the level of poverty of households served. The results of 
this study indicate the mission of these organizations is drifting toward the institutionalist 
philosophy of lending. With this general result, mission drift can be observed within both 
the internal and external margins of the microfinance industry, which influences the 
chosen target market, profit, and structure of MFIs, as determined by the mission of the 
organization. The MFIs included in this sample are lending larger amounts to clients 
across time, targeting high end and small business clients, and are entering into the 
market as non-banking financial institutions and banks as opposed to non-government 
organizations. 
 
KEYWORDS: microfinance; mission drift; institutional environment; organizational 
structure; target market. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Over the last forty years, microfinance has evolved from the provision of small, 
agricultural loans disseminated to impoverished farmers in rural areas to include services 
in urban centers administered to a wide range of households. These institutions now offer 
services beyond microcredit and operate within diverse organizational structures and 
institutional environments. Scholars debate the impact of this organizational 
metamorphosis in terms of the outcomes of the institution and the sustainability of this 
form of development aid. It seems that microfinance institutions intend to fulfill mission 
directed outcomes but are coming under pressure to become sustainable financial 
institutions. The mission of the organization, in theory, determines the target market 
served and guides the provision of services, in terms of outputs, to specific types of 
clients. In this piece, this distinction will be framed in terms of a welfarist versus 
institutionalist philosophy of lending, each with a focus on a particular clientele, desired 
outcome, and attained by particular administration of services. 
1.2 Research Question and Theoretical Constructs 
In this study, the link between the mission of an organization will be explored, 
framed within the organizational construct of the institution, defined by its charter or 
legal type, and from the outputs of the organization. Using the average loan balance of 
the organization over time as the main dependent variable, the subsequent regression 
analyses will examine the relationship between this variable and explanatory variables 
which best indicate the overall health of microfinance institutions, including the scope of 
the organization, the demographic served, and the age of the organization. The main 
2 
research question for the analysis is as follows: given that a positive, overall shift in 
average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact 
microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive 
margins? In theory, MFIs with larger average loan balances are also serving households 
closer to the subsistence poverty level (considered the entrepreneurial poor), as opposed 
to those living on less than two dollars per day (considered the core poor). This shift to 
lending to the entrepreneurial poor from what some scholars argue is the original intent of 
microfinance, which in summary is to offer small loans to extremely impoverished 
households, is ultimately impacting the target demographics served and the outputs of 
these institutions. Newer MFIs are now entering the market implementing a mission that 
makes financial sustainability a main output of the organization, while targeting 
households who have entrepreneurial potential and the minimal amount of collateral 
required to receive a loan from these MFIs.  
Through this analysis I hope to show that a shift in outcome is occurring within 
individual MFIs and also across microfinance as an industry, as can be measured in the 
sample. This shift, from serving the “poorest of the poor” to those living just below the 
poverty line in terms of target demographic, is occurring across time in existing, 
individual MFIs, but also is impacting newer MFIs entering the market; this will be 
measured by the shift in average loan balance across the panel. In this sample, as MFIs 
increase in years of operation, the amount they are lending to borrowers also increases, 
all else equal. Secondarily, those MFIs considered new and young are lending greater 
amounts to fewer borrowers. 
3 
1.3 Organization of Study 
The relationship between the legal type and its associated mission, in conjunction 
with the average loan balance of the institution as a proxy for the outputs of the 
organization, will be explored further in the subsequent chapters. First, a review of 
literature will be presented, which encompasses the rationale for microfinance, the 
metamorphosis of microfinance as an industry, the impact that the mission of these 
organizations has on the outcome, and the influence of the institutional environment. In 
addition, the review of literature discusses theoretical considerations surrounding 
microfinance institutions, in terms of the target markets of MFIs, how profit influences 
the mission of these organizations, factors influencing interest rates and the risk 
associated with borrowers, and the manner in which the institutional environment of an 
organization impacts the mission and outcomes of the institution. These relationships will 
be tested in the empirical section, which includes four empirical models that regress 
different iterations of average loan balance against factors that assist in gauging the 
overall health of the organization and the fulfillment of their intended mission. The final 
section will discuss the implications of these models and areas of future research. 
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter discusses a wide range of topics surrounding microfinance 
organizations and the literature surrounding these subjects. First, a brief discussion of the 
rationale for microfinance and history of this development strategy will be reviewed. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the links between microfinance utilizing this service 
as a tool of economic development, in relation to the evolutionary path these 
organizations theoretically take in the present literature. The evolution of microfinance 
and the arising schism lays the groundwork for the discussion surrounding the mission of 
these organizations and the manner in which the mission of microfinance is changing on 
the internal and external margins. This discussion will be presented within the framework 
of the populations these institutions serve and the intended outcome of the services they 
provide to their clients. Finally, the literature examining the role that the organizational 
environment can play in the impact and outcomes of microfinance institutions will be 
reviewed in order to provide context for the greater institutional framework in which 
these institutions operate. 
2.2 Rationale for Microfinance 
The basic rationale for offering microbanking services to the poor arises from a 
large body of work in multiple fields including finance, international development policy, 
sociology, agricultural economics, and anthropology. As a basic definition, microfinance 
offers a means for poor households to access financial services, such as short-term loans, 
that can be used to build a microenterprise, provide secure savings options, crop 
insurance, health savings accounts, etc. (Morduch, 1998, 1999, 2000; Littlefield, 
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Morduch and Hashemi, 2003; Dale, 2004; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Rutheven, 
2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Specifically, access to credit benefits recipient 
households when the loan itself provides a net surplus once all costs incurred, both 
financial and social, are deducted from the provision of the loan; microloans provided by 
lending institutions offer a means for poor households to access small amounts of capital 
that can be used for a variety of purposes (Zeller, 2001; IFAD, 2003). In addition to this, 
access to capital can decrease a household’s vulnerability to external shocks as it is 
assumed that the loan recipient(s) will invest the capital in a profit generating venture, 
such as a small business or microenterprise.  
Initially, semi-formal microcredit services were offered primarily in rural areas by 
agricultural development banks and Rotating Credit and Savings Associations (RoSCAs). 
These services included the provision of small loans at shorter terms, to which were 
attached higher, risk adjusted interest rates than traditional financing in the formal 
market. Microfinance as an industry now includes a large urban component that offers a 
variety of microbanking services that provide financial access to a broad range of 
households living below the poverty line (McGuire and Conroy, 1997; Besley, 1994). In 
both urban and rural markets, these institutions target specific populations, predominantly 
the poor, women, and the uneducated (Paxton and Cuevas, 2002). These demographics, 
in general, lack the required collateral to receive loans in the formal banking sector and 
are comprised of extremely poor households that carry elevated levels of risk; since these 
households do hold a small capital endowment that could serve as collateral, they rarely 
qualify for a loan in the formal sector.  
6 
Arguments for why the poor need access to capital are similar to those applied to 
households that have increased levels of financial stability: on the whole, households 
require “…mechanisms to manage cash flows, devices for accumulating assets in both 
the short and long-term, and tools for coping with risk” (Karlan and Morduch, 2009, p. 
3). Many use informal loans in order to mitigate budget shortfalls; this may entail a loan 
from a family member, pooling of resources with neighbors, or taking out a loan from a 
moneylender. The issue with the latter option is that these loans may also involve 
exorbitant interest rates exceeding 200% in some cases, which may decrease the 
household’s future borrowing ability from that specific lender if they default on such a 
loan (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, and Narain, 2009).  
In addition to credit, access to reliable savings mechanisms have become a vital 
component of the provision of financial tools to poor households and empirical evidence 
shows that impoverished households with access to savings opportunities have improved 
overall levels of health, education, and physical assets, especially in agrarian economies 
(Matin, Hulme, and Rutherford, 2002; Awung, 2008; Zeller and Sharma, 2002a). This 
type of semi-formal capital management also reduces the volume of high-cost, informal 
credit held by households provided by moneylenders. Informal loans from moneylenders, 
whose interest can range between 110-200% of the loan principal, can reduce the volume 
of productive assets such as land or livestock held by poor households (McIntosh and 
Wydick, 2005). Many times, these assets must be sold to repay the loan principal and 
interest costs accrued to the money lender, thus reducing the overall capital endowment 
and long-term value of the household (Zeller and Meyer, 2002). Informal loans, in this 
case, create a destabilizing force to the loan-receiving household. Semi-formal access to 
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credit in the form of micro-loans can provide capital to households in such a way as to 
not jeopardize savings previously accrued or other productive assets (Zeller and Meyer, 
2002; Ling, Zhongyi and von Braun, 2002). 
Despite the risk associated with lending to these populations, Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) offer financial access to individuals and households living below the 
poverty line by providing services such as credit, savings, and insurance opportunities 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2008). Once established in an area, MFIs can 
form a semi-formal financial environment in which impoverished households can obtain 
capital when needed. This access positively reinforces the demand for liquid capital 
among the poor; as this demand increases, the volume of long-term assets held by the 
individual households decreases. In other words, the value of capital to a household 
increases over time as the overall capital endowment of that household decreases; this 
demonstrates that poor households value capital at a greater rate than those that have built 
up a capital endowment (Zeller and Meyer, 2002).  
Within this context, a demand for capital from impoverished households exists 
and services offered by MFIs afford poor households access to capital and a means of 
short-term financial management used to mediate budget shocks, including medicines to 
treat unexpected illness, life cycle events (e.g. weddings, funerals, etc.), and expenses 
associated with education (Armedáriz and Morduch, 2004; Wright, 2000). Dale (2001) 
frames this range of services demanded by the clients of these institutions in terms of the 
“potential pursuits” of MFIs, which include financial intermediation, social mobilization, 
organization building, and enterprise development services (p. 609). 
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Microfinance can be seen as a development tool for the “productive poor” who 
lack access to formal markets, but are presently engaged in small- or micro-scale 
business, especially in developing countries (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Such 
households can use the money loaned to mitigate the impact of risks or expand a small 
business (Zeller and Sharma, 2002b). In addition, as microfinance grows as a sector, 
households utilizing these institutions have increasingly demanded savings services over 
lines of credit (Rahman, 1999; Rutherford, 1999; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and 
Ruthven, 2009). With the added savings component, clients continue to utilize the range 
of services provided by the microfinance institution, which includes increased levels of 
savings and capital borrowed per client (Brindisi, 2013). 
2.3 Fostering Microfinance as a Development Tool 
Assisting impoverished households through banking services is not a new 
phenomenon in the developing world. Many countries provided agricultural subsidies or 
small business loans to rural farmers as a part of the rural banking movement of the 
1950s (Matin, et al., 2002; Gonzalez-Vega, 2003; Guitiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and 
Mar Molinero, 2007; Heidhues, Belle-Sossoh, and Buchenrieder, 2002; Weber, 2004; 
von Pischke, 2007; Zeller, 2003; Ellis and Biggs, 2001). The agro-banking model relied 
primarily on agricultural loans targeted to rural farmers in order purchase goods that 
would increase overall productivity, such as fertilizer, drought resistant seeds, etc. This 
movement was downsized in what Wenner (2002) calls the “counterproductivity” of 
liberalization within financial markets of developing countries, as many commercial 
banks who previously offered rural agricultural loans ceased this practice due to the 
restrictions created by the new relaxed, regulatory framework. Liberalization policies 
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introduced the necessary regulations for the financial markets of developing countries to 
enter into international exchange while simultaneously reducing the breadth of services 
offered by commercial banks to the “risk-less” populace, thus excluding a vast portion of 
potential loan recipients due to the perceived risk held by these marginally and extremely 
poor households (Sérven, 2002). It has been argued that these policies allowed 
developing nations to compete in the larger global economy but simultaneously reduced 
domestic investment. 
In addition, many of the agro-banking programs also failed due to institutional 
and programmatic issues, such as restricted levels of outreach in communities, low 
repayment rates, institutional inefficiencies which lead to operating losses, and reliance 
on government subsidies to cover operating shortfalls (Morduch, 1999; Heidhues, et al., 
2002). The vacuum left by the collapse of the agro-banking sector created a unique 
environment in much of the Global South, which the microfinance industry has begun to 
fill. Most attribute the creation of microfinance and the idea of microcredit to Muhammed 
Yunus and associate the creation of the Grameen banking model implemented in rural 
Bangladesh as the new mainstay in the provision of capital to underserved, rural 
households. However, this development tool has been utilized in both the formal and 
informal settings for thousands of years (e.g. cooperative banking in rural China, credit 
unions in the Germanic states, etc.) (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004).  
The basic idea of “modern” microfinance is not new but builds on the foundation 
set by the agro-banking sector. The newly adopted model adds to the basic assumptions 
used in previous iterations of collective cooperative finance and presupposes that there is 
a demand among potential clients for particular banking services and that these clients 
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also have a willingness to repay the loans, while establishing a credit-based relationship 
with the microfinance institution. This reframing of microbanking in the modern context 
targeted impoverished households, specifically women, provided group based lending 
based upon the assumptions of joint liability and peer pressure to insure repayment of 
loans, and compulsory savings component for all members (Quinones and Seibel, 2000). 
In fact, some authors argue that the poor consider access to savings as an essential 
monetary tool over credit and will borrow money in order to have capital to save over 
time as a means of cash flow management (McGuire and Conroy, 1997; Rutherford, 
1999; Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002; Collins, et al., 2009). Savings provided by 
microfinance institutions in this structure allows for the households to manage risk and 
smooth consumption. 
Microfinance has been classified either as a successful or as an ineffective 
development tool by a variety of practitioners, clients, and analysts. The range of services 
offered, including credit, savings, and insurance options, varies and specific narratives 
regarding the successes and the failures of microfinance programs across the globe 
provide insight into the effectiveness of these organizations in assisting impoverished 
households (Matin, et al., 2002). Several case studies of specific MFIs or MFIs within a 
region or country have been assembled and add to the basic understanding and rationale 
for these organizations in assisting impoverished households. 
Buckley (1997) describes how women entrepreneurs in three African nations 
(Kenya, Malawi and Ghana) do not utilize microfinance loans to establish a new business 
but use the funds offered by outside lines of credit in order to increase or subsidize 
present operations. In this instance, new businesses are primarily created from the 
11 
entrepreneur’s own savings and not from a microloan. The author postulates why he 
believes microcredit does not often yield the expected results in the countries he observes 
over time; this includes the role that enterprise plays within subcultures, the stability of 
the institutional environment and the impact of weak property rights, and how the family 
networks influences the overall use of the loan. In this narrative, the author frames 
microfinance as a tool increasingly utilized by established business persons, which does 
not fall in line with one of the basic assumptions of microfinance that includes starting up 
new businesses in communities. 
Among the regions where microfinance institutions have been well established, 
those MFIs located in South America have seen a shift in terms of the tools used to 
provide services and the organizational structure of these institutions. Navajas, Conning, 
and Gonzalez-Vega (2003) compare the lending technologies and outcomes of two large 
MFIs in Bolivia that began as not-for-profit organizations but have changed their 
organizational charter to become “profitable regulated financial intermediaries” (p. 748). 
The authors find that the type of loan contract offered to households, whether this is a 
personalized loan contract or standardized loan contract, seems to serve as a screening 
mechanism for services. BancoSol targets lower end households utilizing a group lending 
methodology and standardized loan contracts; in contrast, Caja Los Andes screens each 
individual borrower and uses the information obtained to customize the loan contract 
according to what the screener assumes the potential loan recipient can repay.  
Each MFI serves a specific target population; in Bolivia, BancoSol serves lower 
end borrowers while Caja Los Andes targets high-productivity borrowers. In this 
particular study, the authors identify specific households moving from one institution to 
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another based upon the assumed level of production of these households; specifically, a 
borrower at BancoSol that increases its level of productivity will move to Caja Los Andes 
as the provision of services of the latter is greater than that of the former. This case study 
is significant in the present argument and research as it validates the assumption that 
MFIs will tailor the services they offer to the demographic they chose to serve, which 
will be discussed further in subsequent sections. 
Customizing the services offered to particular households, as was done in Bolivia, 
has become a generally accepted practice in providing microloans to impoverished 
households. Brau, Hiatt, and Woodworth (2009) observe that Guatemalan MFIs, which 
are predominantly not-for-profit, target low end households in order to assist them in 
establishing a profit generating business, so that these households can then be eligible for 
loans in the formal banking sector. Kaboski and Townsend (2005) observe that MFIs in 
rural and semi-urban Thailand offer a wide range of services and have seen success in a 
particular subset of services. Those MFIs that offer “training services, savings services, 
and pledged savings accounts...were each individually associated with faster asset growth 
rates” (p. 3); conversely, those that link services to agricultural outcomes did not see long 
term success or organizational sustainability. In addition, these particular households, 
which were mostly in village banks, seemed to demand “flexible accounts” that can be 
used to reduce the impact of income shocks such as family emergencies. Again, this 
study highlights that MFIs are not homogenous and offer a wide range of services to the 
clients they assist. 
In addition to the type of target market and the customization of these services, 
serving the poor in a particular environment influences the outcomes and sustainability of 
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microfinance organizations. Navajas and Gonzalez-Vega (2000) observe that the majority 
of MFIs in Latin America serve an urban population, as opposed to the largely rural 
composition of Asian MFIs. Specifically, in El Salvador lending technologies have been 
customized in order to reach the designated target market of the MFI in the particular 
environment which they are operating. The authors frame this as “...systematically 
adapting non-traditional lending technologies...” that “...have created comparative 
advantages in reaching particular market niches and have matched different lending 
procedures with different types of potential clients” (p. 3). This difference was observed 
within one MFI, Financiera Calpiá, which serves both urban and rural households; urban 
borrowers are mostly microentrepreneurs while rural borrowers are farmers, traders or 
microentrepreneurs. Therefore, this particular institution must customize services, from 
the type of banking tools used to maintain operations to the strategies utilized by loan 
officers to the lending technologies offered to their clients. Again, it can be observed in 
this case study that within one MFI, these institutions must customize their services to the 
demographic they serve in order to meet the demand of their customers and maintain 
long-term operations 
The latest philosophy of banking to the poor takes into account the complexities 
introduced by information asymmetries and moral hazard between the loan recipient and 
the lender, which impact the demand and supply of capital because of the risks and high 
transaction costs associated with lending to the poor which were observed in the 
preceding case studies of microfinance institutions (Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). 
Compared to commercial banks, the microfinance sector is less regulated, has higher loan 
repayment rates among loan recipients than the formal market, and continues to grow as 
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an emergent, semi-formal financial sector. In addition, as the sector grows and MFIs can 
better assess the demands of their client base, many MFIs are introducing a savings 
component into their services, which has become very popular. Rutherford (1999) 
proposes that microfinance institutions should provide a wide range of services to 
impoverished households, but more importantly provide and emphasize savings as a vital 
component in assisting these households in managing their wealth. Despite this 
movement towards providing a broader range of banking services, most MFIs’ product 
range is much less diverse than commercial banks (especially MFIs that are not-for-
profit) and, overall, lack liquidity in terms of mobilizing equity, as savings is not a 
service offered by the majority of MFIs (O’Brien, 2006). 
The challenge for policy makers, creditors, and donors in supporting programs 
such as microfinance is ensuring that this development tool is used as a poverty reduction 
program in order to target aid toward the intended demographic and desired outcomes, 
which in the case of microfinance involves increasing a household’s earning potential 
through access to business start-up capital or subsidizing budget shortfalls via microloans 
(Hulme and Mosley, 1997; Sharma and Buchenreider, 2002; Wright, 2000). The long-
term impact of microfinance hinges on the overall sustainability of the lending program 
and institution, and, in turn, the ability of the households to utilize the capital lent in 
creating lasting and sustainable sources of income. Effectively including the poor in 
financial markets benefits the entire economic system of a developing nation by 
increasing these households’ ability to manage shocks and crises, which most 
governments in this classification cannot provide due to a general scarcity of public funds 
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that could be allocated to social welfare programs (Zeller, 2001; IFAD, 2003; Christen, 
Lauer, Lyman and Rosenberg, 2011). 
Government involvement in financial development programs can assist in 
creating an institutional environment that promotes overall economic stability. This may 
increase the flow of capital to the poorest households with, for example, policies that 
clarify the property rights of individuals which can be used as loan collateral (Churchill, 
1997; Lepanu, 2002; Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park, 1993). The challenge remains 
for governments to maintain a balance in the policy environment which aids in 
macroeconomic stability while promoting an environment where informal businesses, 
such as microenterprises, can positively contribute to overall economic growth (Yaron 
and Benjamin, 2002). Microloans, supplied by informal or semi-formal institutions such 
as MFIs, fill a gap in the provision of capital to poor households that the formal market 
cannot support, given it is assumed that these loan recipients will have an increased rate 
of default and carry excessive risk (Matin, Hulme, and Rutherford, 2002). As such, in 
some environments, government support of MFIs through liberalization policies would 
generate a positive social return in the long run for the poorest households (Yaron, 1992; 
Zeller, et al., 1997; Zeller, 2003). This will be discussed further in Section 2.7. 
2.4 Evolution and Schism of Microfinance 
Although not as diverse in terms of services offered to clients when compared to 
banks in the formal financial sector, a pattern has emerged in the development of MFIs as 
semi-formal lending institutions. Microfinance institutions seem to develop in two 
distinct phases. In the first phase, small loans are disseminated to potential entrepreneurs 
in a community, where the main target of the program is increasing the volume of loans 
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disseminated in the community to impoverished households and the institution 
concentrates on growth as the main outcome. Loans become a vehicle for economic 
development within the community, promoting long-term improvement in household 
quality of life and production capacity. The second phase involves increasing the volume 
of loans as an expansion of services where the MFI distinguishes between two groups, 
those who utilize the services offered for consumption smoothing purposes and those 
who invest the capital lent into a small business venture, where it is assumed that the 
small business will become a semi-permanent, profit-generating venture for the 
household. In this framework, financial sustainability becomes a focus of the MFI while 
creating a programmatic shift towards community development, in terms of improving 
the overall quality of life of the loan recipients (at this point not taking into account 
spillover effects) (Seibel, 1985).  
This evolutionary process directly reflects the mission chosen by the institution 
and the type of lending model used, where the lending model is associated with the 
baseline household income level of those served by the institution (i.e. institutions with 
an individual lending model tend to serve subsistence poor households over core poor 
households) (Arch, 2005; Farrington and Abrams, 2002). Types of MFIs include 
development banks, private foundations, multilateral banks, and commercial banks with 
microcredit subsidiaries. 
MFIs can either concentrate on financial sustainability by creating financial 
breadth or poverty reduction which involves increased outreach and reliance on financial 
subsidies to maintain operations; each involves a distinct set of lending practices and 
goals determined by the MFI’s mission statement and established by its governing board 
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members or shareholders (Ledgerwood, 1999; Mosley and Hulme, 1998; Schreiner, 
2002; Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters, 2011). Outreach can be formally defined as 
“worth minus cost, weighted by depth, summed across breadth of users and scope of 
contracts, and discounted through length of time” (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-
Vega and Rodriguez-Meza, 2002, p. 156). Sustainability in this context relies almost 
exclusively upon the length and type of service provided to households by the institution 
(Lepanu, 2002).  
Bogan (2009) suggests that all MFIs proceed through a life-cycle in terms of 
creating a viable and sustainable financial institution, from developing subsidized 
operations at the beginning of the life-cycle to establishing a reliable client base which 
meets the capital requirements for covering the operating expenses of the institution. 
McGuire and Conroy (1997) distinguish between the goals of the institution in terms of 
the financial innovation used, whether that is through the financial institution itself, the 
system supporting the organization, the process via the financial tools provided to clients, 
or the services provided to clients. 
Throughout the life-cycle, microfinance institutions, in theory, target specific 
households or a sub-set of the poor in order to fulfill a specific outcome. This is reflected 
in the mission of the organization and the means by which the MFI carries out the goals 
of the institution, which is also linked to the mission. MFIs have three modes of operation 
in this framework, which are reinforced by the mission of the organization: survival, 
sustainability, or self-sufficiency (Pollinger, Outhwaite, and Cordero-Guzmán, 2007). 
Survival emphasizes dissemination and repayment of loans at a flat interest rate for all 
borrowers in order to meet monthly expenses; other financial services such as savings are 
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not offered during this stage. In the second mode of operation, institutions concentrate on 
sustainability and have the ability to raise capital in order to maintain a specific level of 
outreach by procuring grants that subsidize operations, temporary business loans from the 
formal market or international organizations, or increasing the program participant base. 
Finally, those MFIs who have incorporated a self-sufficiency clause in their mission rely 
solely on income generated by interest on the loans disseminated, where the APR is set to 
the most efficient rate to maintain an appropriate level of clients, who hold as much risk 
as the institution itself is willing to absorb, while maintaining a necessary capital base for 
lending to present and future clients (Caudill, Gropper and Hartarska, 2009). These 
methods of operation can be, but are not entirely, mutually exclusive in terms of linking 
organizational outcomes to the mission of the organization and many MFIs use a 
combination of techniques in order to maintain present and future levels of institutional 
operation.  
In terms of linking the mission of the organization to the operational state of the 
lending entity, many organizations establish a formal mission statement which reflects 
both the target market and intended outcome of the institution. Mission statements of 
MFIs can define the overall goal of the entity and classify the framework of their 
outreach, where the goal may be to reduce poverty, to become a self-sustaining lending 
entity or a combination thereof (Hishigsuren, 2007; Kirkpatrick and Maimbo, 2002; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2010). This overarching goal also encompasses the intended social 
benefits of the organization to its clients, which is linked directly to the targeted outreach 
methodology of the MFI. This incorporates the clients’ willingness to repay the loans, the 
overall sum of costs (price and transaction) to the clients, the level of poverty of the 
19 
clients (marginal versus chronic poverty levels), the total number of clients the MFI can 
potentially support, the duration of supply, and scope of services the MFI can offer given 
their equity base (e.g. loans, savings, insurance, etc.) (Schreiner, 2002, p. 2).  
Those MFIs who choose poverty alleviation (outreach) as their primary goal 
assume that serving a large number of clients will make up for the lack of financial 
reserves that would be generated in focusing on creating a self-sustaining lending model. 
Conversely, those MFIs who concentrate on financial breadth seek to build a self-
sustaining network of borrowers by creating viable financial instruments rather than 
focusing solely on decreasing the overall poverty level of the clients served, regardless of 
the loss to the institution. An institution is considered self-sustaining when it is able “to 
cover at least 99.5% of expenses exclusive of subsidies or grants…generating sufficient 
profit to cover expenses while eliminating all subsidies, even those less-obvious 
subsidies, such as loans made in hard currency with repayment in local currency” (Tucker 
and Miles, 2004, p. 42).  
While both types of MFIs strive to reduce the level of poverty in the demographic 
they choose to serve, those concentrating on financial breadth add a level of complexity 
to their mission by necessitating that the fulfillment of this mission include lending and 
savings instruments that the organization can maintain over time. Dale (2001) frames this 
difference in terms of the focus and scope of the organization in which the minimalist 
organization concentrates on financial sustainability, while the integrated organization 
includes a broader range of services that may include literacy training, training in 
nutrition, etc. 
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With the distinction between two broad classifications of intended outcomes 
through the mission, this statement directly impacts the institutional performance and 
outcomes of MFIs by distinguishing the goals of and population served by the lending 
entity. Mission statements serve as a means by which the organization clearly defines 
expectations for employees, overall goals, and intended outreach priorities (Weis and 
Piderit, 1999). Mission also impacts the composition of borrowers an organization serves, 
where an organization seeking to reach the poorest borrowers will absorb greater levels 
of risk as they intentionally include and target a higher percentage “non-bankable” 
borrowers (Pollinger, et al., 2007). This serves as the basic framework for the operations 
of the organization.  
The mission of these organizations impacts not only the target demographic of the 
organization but can also influence the methods of lending or product offered by a 
particular entity. Guitiérrez-Nieto, et al., (2007) frame the mission of microfinance 
institutions as adhering to a model of intermediation or production; MFIs either 
emphasize collecting deposits in order to create capital to be redistributed or emphasize 
the production of outputs through the generation of physical assets, respectively. 
However, despite a clearly defined mission and the intended outcomes, it seems that the 
missions of outreach based MFIs can drift toward financial sustainability (Ling, et al., 
2002). It is important to take into account that MFIs meet operating costs via interest 
incomes generated by loans, which amounts to “...the rate charged to borrowers less the 
MFI cost of funding—and associated fees, including both one-time fees and those levied 
at regular intervals through the loan term” (Pollinger, et al., 2007, p. 29). MFIs must 
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balance their mission directed purpose to fall within each individual organization’s 
budget constraint.  
As these organizations evolve and become a semi-permanent part of local 
economies, MFIs can utilize the information they obtain and record regarding clients and 
offer services to particular groups of poor households, tailored to the amount of risk the 
organization is willing to take on and perceives that these particular households hold. 
These organizations remain risk averse in their basic relationship to clients and the 
services they provide reflect this, as they do not operate within the same environment as 
formal banking institutions; a quarter or year of high default rates and the MFI may be 
forced to close its doors. 
Bogan (2009) frames the evolutionary change within MFIs as the life-cycle theory 
of microfinance, linking the chosen target demographic to the services offered within the 
organization’s ability to sustain itself, with or without outside capital assistance. This 
theory creates a link between the stage of development of the MFI in terms of its capital 
structure, operational sustainability, efficiency in generating its product, and overall 
outreach to its target demographic (Helms, 2006; Fehr and Hishigsuren, 2004; Farrington 
and Abrams, 2002; Meyer and Zeller, 2002; Sharma and Buchenrieder, 2002). 
Sustainability in this framework can be measured in terms of the operational and 
financial aspects of the organization, where the former is purely linked to the balance 
sheet (i.e. are the revenues generated covering the costs of producing the number of loans 
demanded) and the latter takes into account the amount of subsidization the organization 
requires to maintain itself. 
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As the use of loans and the demand for banking services by poor households has 
changed, so must the lenders’ ideology of providing capital to the households accessing 
funds in the form of services demanded, creating a secondary shift in the motivation 
behind microbanking aside from the designation of a target demographic of the 
organization. Clients are now demanding services such as savings, health insurance 
accounts, tuition escrow accounts, crop insurance, etc., and can utilize these services 
from MFIs as they are not available from the formal banking market for the standard 
reasons of risk associated with this subset of clients. If subsidies allow for the expansion 
of services to include more of what clients demand and retain them as long run clients, 
this could ensure the long-term sustainability of the organization, while meeting the 
fundamental principles of both the welfarist and institutionalist philosophies of 
microbanking. Regardless of this interaction, the demand for services from each distinct 
target market is becoming an important component of organizational output for 
microfinance institutions. 
Microfinance as an industry has not evolved to a pluralistic perspective that blurs 
the lines of the “schism” and most practitioners still hold to either the welfarist or 
institutionalist framework of microlending. In practice, the schism is manifested through 
the charter or legal type which the MFI self-selects and thereby determines its basic 
lending structure and, in turn, the clients it chooses to predominantly serve. The category 
that the mission of the organization falls within is directly linked to the charter type of the 
organization. For the sake of the theoretical considerations in this piece, legal or charter 
type will be the proxy for the assumptions surrounding the institutional type discussed 
above. The charter type and the subsequent mission reflect the basic beliefs of the 
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organization, defining the lending model the institution aligns itself with in terms of 
managing short-run and long-run operations, along with the demographic of the targeted 
loan recipients. MFIs classified as banks, in this framework, embody the institutionalist 
approach to lending, as they emphasize operational sustainability through loans and 
savings opportunities. Conversely, non-government organizations (NGOs) choose to 
target the poorest households in a community, making smaller loans to a greater number 
of clients while potentially relying on subsidies such as grants to maintain operations, 
which closely resembles the welfarist perspective.  
The basic differences between the welfarist and institutionalist ideologies are 
shown below in Figure 2.4.1. The conceptual differences of these types of organizations 
(welfarist versus institutionalist) are the poverty lending approach versus financial 
systems approach, respectively (Robinson, 2001; Moll, 2005). These concepts are then 
measured using the charter or legal type of the organization, average loan balance, and 
the correlating target market. Figure 2.4.1 maps both these measurable variables to the 
broader concepts. The boundary of $1,000 in average loan balance is ultimately arbitrary 
but is based upon benchmarks set in previous research (Bogan, 2009; Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Morduch, 2008; Hartarska and Mersland, 2012; Hermes, Lensink and 
Meesters, 2011; Hishigsuren, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Vogelgesang; 2003). 
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Figure 2.4.1: Welfarist versus Institutionalist Microfinance Institutions 
 
This diagram illustrates the basic generalizations regarding the services provided 
by both types of MFIs as discussed throughout this chapter, as these institutions offer 
different services across the spectrum of potential clients in many different combinations. 
Welfarist organizations primarily target core poor households and are not-for-profit 
organizations lending smaller average loan balances. Institutionalist organizations seek to 
maximize their profits in order to maintain services to their clients; because of this they 
target the entrepreneurial poor who they consider to hold less risk than the core poor and 
lend larger amounts to these households as a result.  
Morduch (2000) labels this as the “schism between rhetoric and action,” where 
the institution may in theory, as outlined in their mission, seek to alleviate poverty but is 
faced with the difficulty of maintaining a financially sustainable organization that can 
serve the target demographic over multiple periods. From this schism, financially-minded 
and socially-minded practitioners clash in terms of the use and impact of microlending as 
a poverty alleviation tool, as the former directs services with the sole purpose of 
maintaining operations and the latter seeks to assist a greater volume of impoverished 
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households (p. 618). A shift in the mission of microcredit supplying organizations can 
arise due to the tension created by two juxtaposed ideologies of microfinance, which 
includes the pressure to create a financially sustainable organization against the mission 
of providing capital transfer services to poor households in the form of lines of credit, 
savings accounts, crop insurance, etc. Many MFIs add a sustainability clause to their 
mission statement as a way to formally establish their intent to form a sustainable 
organization which may be attributed to pressure from board members, funding agencies, 
government regulators, etc., concerned with the long-term community impact and 
financial viability of the organization. This is the schism of microfinance; the issue that 
arises due to the shift from a welfarist to an institutionalist mindset includes a 
fundamental tenant of microfinance surrounding interest rates, assumed risk, and capital 
returns to the MFI and is reflected in the mission of the organization (Morduch 1999, 
2000; Dale, 2001; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004;).  
In line with the theory surrounding the schism of microfinance, interest rates are 
theoretically kept below the regulated, formal market interest rate in order to provide 
capital to the collateral-less, poor households wishing to use credit in order to build a 
business or smooth consumption. MFIs attempt to select loan recipients who will create a 
local small business, which will positively support a sustainable development model in 
the community in which it exists, under the assumption that the local economy can 
absorb these microenterprises in order reap the economies of scale created by these small 
businesses (Bateman, 2010). Therefore, MFIs must set a generalized interest rate which 
does not crowd out a particular subset of poorer households but that simultaneously 
generates sufficient interest income for the MFI to maintain operations. If the rate is too 
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high, the poorest households will be crowded out due to the expense of the loan; if it is 
too low, the MFI may be absorbing too much risk in terms of their loan portfolio and, in 
turn, decreases the long-term sustainability of the organization. Generating a sustainable 
organization can lead to increased economic security for borrowers, reduced reliance on 
moneylenders and other volatile sources of informal credit, increased security in social 
networks (especially in those MFIs adhering to a group lending model), and increased 
production potential for individuals and households (Dale, 2001).  
Each side of the debate has a distinct critique of the opposing ideology. From a 
welfarist perspective, institutionalist organizations focus too heavily on financial 
sustainability as the main outcome of the organization, as previously discussed, and 
accomplish this goal by profit maximization via interest rates set to levels very similar to 
those in the formal market. These interest rates allow the MFI to reduce or eliminate 
reliance on external subsidies to cover operating expenses. The core poor households, 
who according to the original purpose of microfinance are the target demographic, are 
driven out of the MFI market due to the commercialization of MFIs and the shift in staff 
members’ focus to disseminating loans to sustain operations, meet quarterly lending 
quotas, etc.  
Conversely, institutionalist organization ideology takes issue with the welfarist 
entities’ focus on population as opposed to a sustainable outcome. Per the institutionalist 
perspective, welfarist organizations’ concentrate on maximizing short-run profits instead 
of focusing on the long-term benefits of supporting sustainable business ventures in the 
community. By concentrating on the short-run gains to cover long-term costs, welfarist 
institutions must rely on subsidies to cover operational shortfalls and sustain future 
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lending cycles. These subsidies, provided many times by external funding agencies such 
as development aid groups, assist welfarist organizations in maintaining operations but 
create a vacuum of sorts where the organization is neither operationally self-sufficient nor 
sustainable, major tenants of the institutionalist philosophy.  
However, this schism between the welfarist and institutionalist ideologies may not 
be a rift between two opposing viewpoints but simply the manifestation of evolution 
within the microfinance industry, a natural course in terms of development in these 
organizations. MFIs can potentially assist a spectrum of poor households, ranging from 
the core poor to the entrepreneurial poor to the lower middle class by offering a variety of 
services, from a formal banking model to a group based cooperative approach to a not-
for-profit lending model, etc. This speaks to the metamorphosis of microfinance as a 
semi-formal banking industry, where it is no longer solely used as a source of capital for 
small businesses owned by impoverished households.  
The institution concentrating on creating sustainable operations without external 
subsidization assesses its client base and the available equity, assigning the appropriate 
interest rate to absorb the risk associated with lending to particular populations. This may 
lead to the institution lending larger amounts to fewer clients, which will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. Outreach based or welfarist MFIs tend to lend smaller 
amounts at a greater rate, which leads to higher transaction costs. This increases the costs 
of operation for the institution in terms of the administration of loans. To reduce this cost, 
MFIs adopting this lending methodology rely on subsidies to maintain operations, while 
reducing the cost of administering the higher volume of loans (Morduch, 1999). 
However, many MFIs are under increased pressure from board members and donors to be 
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self-sustaining, which falls in line with the sustainable development movement; this 
pressure can force outreach based MFIs to lend slightly larger amounts to less poor 
(potentially entrepreneurial) households in order to reduce administrative costs and 
reliance on subsidies to maintain long-term operations. This is the main rift in the 
discussion of mission drift within MFIs.  
This rift or schism in rhetoric and action, as discussed above, creates an 
environment where MFIs must heavily depend upon subsidization by donors and/or aid 
agencies to meet budget shortfalls, given that they choose to target poorer households and 
the smaller loans that these clients demand. Donor subsidization offers a means for the 
MFI to retain present client levels (and perhaps even increase client levels), while 
preserving the intended social benefits of the MFI and some semblance of institutional 
efficiency (Morduch, 1999).  
Efficiency in this context is linked to the environment in which the institution 
operates, the profit status of the entity (e.g. non-government organization), how credit 
officers implement the mission of the organization in terms of inputs, and the gross loan 
portfolio of the institution (Guitiérrez-Nieto, et al., 2007). The composition of the 
governing board directly influences the efficiency of the microfinance institution. As the 
number of creditors on a board of governors or directors increases, the overall financial 
efficiency, in terms of self-sustaining operations, of the organization also increases. 
Hartarska and Mersland (2009) argue that a board comprised mostly of donors decreases 
the efficiency of the organization, in terms of meeting operating costs and financial 
outcomes, because donors are less likely to be concerned with long-run cost minimization 
and instead concentrate on increasing services to their target demographic. Again, this 
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may decrease organizational efficiency and lead to budget shortfalls that are covered by 
grants or other forms of subsidization. Governance of the rules adopted by the board with 
clearly outlined goals and outcomes, regardless of the composition of this group of 
individuals, can also indicate the level of efficiency at which an institution will operate 
given the assumptions discussed above that are reflected in the organization’s mission 
(Lepanu, 2002).  
Weiss, Montgomery, and Kurmanalieva (2003) specifically outline the links 
between subsidizing and the intended outcomes of the organization. 
...the issue should be, what benefits in terms of income gains for 
the poor can be achieved with the subsidy and how does the ratio 
of subsidy to benefits compare with that for other 
interventions...there is a need to continually improve design and 
outreach and to see MFIs as part of the package for targeting the 
poor, rather than the whole solution (p. 16-7).  
This suggests that short-term subsidies, in order to preserve long term goals, may be 
necessary to cover the costs of supplying loans by MFIs, especially in the case of MFIs 
whose primary mission is poverty reduction.  
However, proponents of financial sustainability claim that subsidies weaken the 
financial viability of the lending entity in the long term, if the number of clients served 
continues to grow and subsidization remains at the same level. Within this argument, the 
interest rate the organization charges, which is contingent on the number of potential 
borrowers, is secondarily influenced by the amount the organization is subsidized. This 
value-neutral interest rate, as defined by Pollinger, et al., (2007), is determined by 
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gauging the demand by borrowers and lenders in the market. Therefore, each MFI must 
determine the subsidy required to maintain operations if the established interest rate is not 
sufficient enough to cover operating expenses. As boards are pressuring MFIs to reduce 
reliance on subsidies, there is movement within the microfinance community to use 
lending contracts, with specified terms similar to those in the formal market, in order to 
ensure that the MFI can generate profit enough to sustain the institution at an interest rate 
acceptable to both the loan recipient and the lender (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004; 
Daley-Harris, 2003). 
Another means by which microfinance institutions chose to mitigate an excess of 
demand for their services is through group lending models or self help groups (SHGs). 
This model of microfinance allows multiple borrowers to form one group and pool 
resources, while reducing the overhead costs of lending to individuals to the MFI. For 
example, five borrowers each contribute twenty dollars to their joint account; one 
member of the group is allowed to borrow a certain percentage, or in some cases all of 
the balance to use for the month. The borrowed amount is then repaid to the joint account 
by the repayment date plus interest; using this framework, the group retains a specific 
balance with the MFI and the MFI is generating sufficient interest income to maintain the 
service for the borrowers. 
Self help groups (SHGs) utilized by ROSCAs reduce information asymmetries 
because loan recipients actively seek out potential group members with similar levels of 
risk, also known as assortative matching (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004; Stiglitz, 
1990). These groups will utilize peer monitoring in order to ensure they will continue to 
receive loans as a group in the future (Stiglitz, 1990). Expected costs associated with safe 
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groups of borrowers will be lower compared to riskier borrowers. It is assumed safer 
groups will also be more active in such an environment as they will have a greater 
likelihood to continue to receive credit; riskier borrowing groups, should they default on 
a loan, will no longer be eligible to receive capital from that specific lending institution.  
Given that potential borrowers have multiple options in terms of lending 
institutions within their community, matching can also occur between the type of client 
and the type of institution; those clients who have collateral will gravitate toward 
individual loans, while those that do not have access to collateral borrow via the group 
lending model (Aseefa, Hermes, and Meesters, 2012; Meyer and Zeller, 2002; Peterson 
and Rajan, 1995). This also correlates with the type of institution who offers such 
services, where institutionalist organizations provide loans to individuals and welfarist 
organizations loan to groups at a greater rate. Hermes, et al., (2011) find that group 
lending is the model primarily used by rural banks and non-government organizations 
(NGOs) and generally costs institutions less in terms of costs per borrower, which can be 
attributed to peer monitoring and assortative matching. Across the MFI sector, the 
increased entrance of banks and non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) has led to an 
overall increase in the average loan balance distributed.  
While some authors consider this sector wide mission drift, the mission of 
previously established MFIs is not necessarily changing but the increased presence of 
banks within the market, as a whole, is influencing the type of lending methodology 
(individual lending contracts versus group lending models). Within this environment, 
impoverished households are more likely to receive individual loans and the overall size 
of the average loan balance is increasing (Navajas, et al., 2002). It may also represent an 
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overall shift in the generally accepted lending philosophy within the microfinance 
community, where varying types of lending contracts may offer a more permanent 
solution to the schism of microfinance which can mitigate the lending institutions’ 
challenge of determining the risk of the client and the demand for capital in under-served 
populations (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2004; Daley-Harris, 2003; Meyer and Zeller, 
2002). Poorest clients will gravitate toward group lending models to reduce their own risk 
of default, while those households who have minimal amounts of collateral may choose 
an institution that mimics a formal bank and disseminates loans to individuals.  
2.5 Mission Drift and Microfinance Institutions 
As seen in the previous section, the mission of an organization influences the 
outcome and tools used to reach this goal. The mission of microfinance institutions falls 
within two basic camps, with these organizations either concentrating on outreach to 
clients or financial sustainability. Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth (1999) frame this 
difference in mission as either the institutionalist (financial sustainability) or the welfarist 
(outreach) approach to microfinance. These two lending ideologies of microfinance 
institutions can also be framed as a poverty lending approach (welfarist) or financial 
systems approach (institutionalist) (Hishigsuren, 2007). 
As the basic mission of microfinance was to assist impoverished households 
through the dissemination of micro-loans in order to improve the short-term outlook of 
these households, a change in the focus of this mission can be observed through the 
outcomes of microfinance institutions. Mission drift manifests itself in the model of 
lending (e.g. to individuals, group lending, cooperatives, etc.) and the institutional 
structure of the lending entity (e.g. bank, credit union, subsidized loans, etc.) (Sadoulet, 
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2005; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2007). Some authors postulate that existing 
MFIs are not changing their missions by drifting toward one extreme or the other but that 
each of these approaches, welfarist or institutionalist, defines the community served 
differently and creates financial instruments to best serve these populations while 
maintaining other institutional goals (Woller, Dunford and Woodworth, 1999). However, 
as discussed in this section, it seems that more institutionalist organization are entering 
the microfinance market, and thereby influencing the broader mission of these 
institutions. In addition, the degree to which the amount lent to clients increases 
demonstrates the directional shift of an organization’s mission and corresponding output; 
as the average balance of loans disseminated increases across time, the depth of the 
organization decreases because it now provides larger loans to fewer clients (Hermes, 
Lensink, and Meesters, 2011).  
As a result of the schism of microfinance and the mission alignment of these 
organizations between two basic ideologies, the services offered and target demographics 
of these organizations also vary. Several authors generate hypotheses as to why this 
occurs. In terms of the services produced by MFIs and the costs associated with these 
products, smaller loans cost the organization more to generate per borrower than larger 
loans, in terms of the transaction costs. Many MFIs are adopting policies that would 
support an increase in average loan balance so as to decrease the per unit costs associated 
with lending, which reinforces the debate surrounding the trade-off between outreach and 
sustainability (Moll, 2005; Zeller and Johanssen, 2006; Hishigsuren, 2007; Cull, 
Demirgüç-Cunt, and Morduch, 2009; Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011). If MFIs 
adopt such a policy, they would in theory be selecting to disseminate fewer loans to 
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extremely impoverished households (the “core poor”) and lend at a greater level to 
entrepreneurial poor households. Core households demand smaller loans at shorter terms 
than entrepreneurial poor households. As a result, there is a greater likelihood that core 
poor households will receive lending services from welfarist institutions, while 
entrepreneurial poor receive these same services from institutionalist organizations. 
Given that the lender can distinguish between the potential borrowers discussed 
above, welfarist organizations (MFIℓ) will lend at a greater rate to core poor households 
(ℓ) than institutionalist organizations; conversely, institutionalist organizations (MFIh) 
will lend at a greater rate to entrepreneurial poor households (h) than welfarist 
organizations, which is a generally accepted statement and validated hypothesis in the 
literature surrounding these organizations.  
This designation of organizational and borrower type are based upon the 
assumptions of the law of diminishing returns as reframed by Armendáriz and Morduch, 
(2010). In this framework, the capital to output ratio of the entrepreneurial poor yields a 
greater return on investment than that of the core poor due to the relationship between the 
initial endowments of each type of household and subsequent earnings potential held by 
these households (Lucas, 1990; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Figure 2.5.2, a direct 
replication of Figure 1.4 as presented by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, p. 21), presents 
a graphical depiction of the difference between the capital to output ratio of the two types 
of households as discussed above. In the graph as previously discussed, the return on 
investment for the poorer entrepreneur (core poor borrower) is less than that of the richer 
entrepreneur (entrepreneurial poor). 
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Figure 2.5.2: Marginal Returns to Capital (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) 
 
Although the risk associated with the core poor household is greater than that of 
the entrepreneurial poor household, and in theory should result in greater returns, the 
profit generated by the core poor is substantially less than that of the entrepreneurial poor 
household. In other words, the lending institution considers the entrepreneurial poor to be 
a safer bet, in terms of overall risk and the potential to generate the necessary capital to 
repay the money lent, as these lending institutions are risk averse. In terms of linking 
mission to the outputs of the MFI, the institutionalist organization will lend at a greater 
rate to the entrepreneurial poor due to assumed level of risk and greater likelihood of 
return of initial investment. As risk and financial sustainability are not cornerstones of a 
welfarist mission, these organizations are more likely to lend to the core poor, as the main 
directive of this mission is to assist impoverished households. 
The main assumptions of the Law of Diminishing returns and its application to 
the theory of MFIs are that households differ in terms of the amount of capital each type 
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of poor, classified as either core poor or entrepreneurial poor, may initially hold. In other 
words, the endowment of each demographic influences the level of output of each type of 
the poor. As it is assumed that the endowment varies between the types of households 
discussed, this impacts the household’s ability to use the capital lent by a MFI for a 
business venture. It is assumed that the endowment of poor households is substantially 
less than that of an entrepreneurial poor household. Therefore, the former will use the 
capital lent for consumption smoothing purposes at a greater rate, while the 
entrepreneurial poor are more likely to use loan monies in the creation or support of a 
business.  
The core poor have a smaller marginal return on investment compared to the 
entrepreneurial poor, based upon the potential profitability of each type of household, in 
conjunction with the assumed risk associated with these households and corresponding 
interest rate assigned by the MFI. A household’s output, regardless of their degree of 
poverty, depends on its initial capital endowment, as seen in Figure 2.5.2 and discussed in 
detail by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). This can be applied to both populations, as a 
main assumption of this adaptation of the Law of Diminishing Returns is that the stocks 
of capital held by and the production potential of the latter is greater than that of the 
former. In addition, the rate at which these households are able to generate profits in this 
relationship may be different across multiple households and the degree to which this 
changes is influenced by a variety of factors that are difficult to measure outside of a true 
impact analysis of these services (Hulme, 2000). 
This theory surrounding the distinction between the two types of poor, the 
potential output of these households, and the impact of targeting a specific demographic 
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will be controlled for in the empirical analysis. The target demographic or market of the 
organization is a direct reflection of the mission of the organization, as discussed at 
length in the previous section. These concepts are essential to the subsequent analyses 
and are captured by the explanatory variable “Target Market.” This variable is a 
categorical variable in which MFIs distinguish the group of individuals on which it 
primarily focuses its services; the institutions can designate if they target a broad group of 
borrowers, low end borrowers, high end borrowers, or those households seeking to create 
a small business. This variable is defined in Appendix C. By using this variable, we are 
able to control for the households MFIs define as their primary loan recipients and 
determine if this varies across time which may or may not support the hypothesis that 
mission drift is occurring in these institutions. 
In terms of the target market and profit of microbanking institutions, two broad 
groups of MFIs are emerging in the realm of disseminating micro-loans to two groups of 
poor households: welfarist institutions (MFIℓ) and institutional organizations (MFIh), as 
defined by Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth (2002), and discussed at length in previous 
sections in terms of the relationship between organizational mission and institutional 
outcomes. In theory, these two classifications of MFI serve specific target markets and 
assumed a particular level of risk that is associated with each target market. Specifically, 
MFIs serving the core poor (predominantly welfarist) have higher costs of production and 
are willing to absorb greater levels of risk than those serving the entrepreneurial poor 
(predominantly institutionalist), based upon two assumptions.  
First, the MFI serving the core poor takes on more risk compared to the MFI 
choosing to target the entrepreneurial poor, as the borrowers themselves hold more risk in 
38 
terms of budget based and environmental volatility. Second, the cost of producing smaller 
loans, which are demanded at a greater rate by the core poor as opposed to the 
entrepreneurial poor, is greater than that of larger loans in terms of the per unit cost 
linked to the administration of these loans (Hishigsuren, 2007; McIntosh and Wydick, 
2005; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006).  
Given the assumptions above regarding the households each group of MFIs 
chooses to serve, the potential profit of MFIs and the overall impact of the organization in 
a community are directly impacted by this choice in demographic. Since the costs of 
production are higher for the welfarist organization compared to the institutionalist 
organization based upon the average loan disseminated and the administrative costs 
associated with these loans, the profit of the welfarist institution will be less than that of 
the institutionalist organization. This profit is also linked to the optimal interest rate of 
the organization and is a reflection of the mission of the organization. Gauging the impact 
of the services offered is necessary in assessing the outcomes of the organization, which, 
in theory, are directly linked to the mission of the organization and the target market 
(Hulme 2000; Weiss and Piderit, 1999). 
2.6 Interest Rates and Target Markets 
As discussed above, the likelihood of lending to a particular demographic of the 
poor depends on the perceived risk of the borrower by the MFI. This risk is mitigated by 
the lending institution via the interest rate it assigns to each loan recipient; the riskier 
borrower receives a higher interest rate compared to a safer borrower. Given that an 
institution’s choice in target demographic impacts the overall profit of the organization as 
guided by their established mission, those institutions serving the poor, and especially the 
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core poor, are left with the decision of how to mitigate the cost and risk associated with 
lending to this population. The institution, being both risk averse and profit maximizing, 
will lend the greatest amount of capital at the institution’s optimal interest rate (𝑟̽� ̽) to the 
corresponding demographic (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Again, this rate is influenced by 
the risk associated with the target borrower demographic and costs of providing such a 
service to the particular household or group of households. As seen in Figure 2.6.3, 
adapted from Stigliz and Weiss’ (1981) Figure One titled: “There exists an interest rate 
which maximizes the expected return to the bank,” welfarist and institutionalist MFIs 
have differing interest rates that are determined by the risk they are willing to absorb 
while maintaining services to their target demographic. These optimal interest rates 
maximize the returns to the organization within the constraints of the MFI’s mission. 
Figure 2.6.3: Comparison of Optimal Interest Rate by MFI Type 
 
The optimal interest rate of welfarist institutions (𝑟ℓ∗� ) presently in the market is 
approximately 25% and for institutionalist organizations (𝑟ℎ∗� ) it ranges between 13-19%, 
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which is reflected in the figure above. (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009). In the 
figure above, the welfarist institution has lower expected returns to capital than an 
institutionalist organization due to a combination of factors including, but not limited to, 
lending smaller amounts to clients at a greater interest rate over a shorter period of time, 
in comparison to institutionalist organizations. While welfarist organizations are 
distributing a higher volume of loans in terms of the number of loans to clients, the 
institutionalist organization is lending larger levels of capital in smaller overall volume to 
predominantly the entrepreneurial poor. This distinction between the average loan 
balance of the institution, coupled with the difference in the optimal interest rate of these 
organizations, directly impacts the potential profit of the MFI. 
Microfinance institutions, especially those holding to an institutionalist mission, 
will be less likely to lend to borrowers who are willing to pay greater than the optimal 
interest rate. In either case, loans beyond this rate hold too much potential risk for the 
lending institution, even for the welfarist institution; while the returns on such a loan will 
be much greater due to the interest accrued, the risk of default is also higher, creating a 
lower net return than could be made at 𝑟̽� ̽. Lending institutions ration credit in this 
scenario as the demand of potential borrowers for capital is not equal to the supply of 
loans an institution can afford to lend in order to maintain operations, much in the same 
way credit is rationed in the formal banking sector (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Conversely, welfarist institutions are less likely to ration credit and take on greater risk 
associated with the collateral-less poor households that predominantly demand shorter 
term, higher risk loans. As previously stated, the optimal interest rate is determined in 
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part by the demographic served and becomes a secondary outcome of the adopted 
mission. 
This link between the optimal interest rate and organizational mission will be 
measured in the empirical analysis by including the variable “risk coverage” as a proxy 
for interest rate. This variable is a ratio of the impairment loss of the organization and the 
portfolio of the MFI that is at risk of default greater than thirty days (complete definitions 
are included in Appendix C). It demonstrates the amount of risk the MFI must cover 
based upon rates of loan default by present clients; this value directly impacts the overall 
profit of the organization and offers insight in to the health of the organization in terms of 
maintaining operations. 
Determining the optimal interest rate based upon the client base served and 
assumed repayment rates becomes vital to microfinance institutions in order to maintain 
operations; it is a balance between generating an appropriate return on investment while 
serving the chosen target demographic. Rosenberg (2002) presents a basic equation that 
can be used in order to determine the sustainable interest rate (?̂?) and is a function of five 
basic variables and relies heavily on the principles discussed by Christen (1997) that 
influence the optimal interest rate of microfinance institutions. The equation is presented 
to practitioners of microfinance as means to determine their optimal interest rate given 
their current clientele; neither the Rosenberg article nor the Christen book includes 
empirical testing of this equation. 
?̂? =  
𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 − 𝐼𝐼
1 − 𝐿𝐿
 
Administrative Expense Rate (AE) is comprised of all annual recurrent costs to 
the MFI with the exception of the cost of funds and loan losses. The loan loss rate (LL) is 
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the “annual loss due to uncollectible loans” and usually falls between one to two percent 
per annum; if this ratio is greater than 5%, the institution is considered unviable. As 
welfarist institutions are lending to a riskier population, it is assumed that their loan loss 
rate (LL) will be higher than an institutionalist organization. Cost of funds (CF) is the 
future cost of capital based upon present commercial rates of capital; in this scenario, it 
includes the baseline equity of an organization less the financial and fixed assets and 
liabilities held. The Capitalization Rate (K) is the real profit rate set as a target in order to 
maintain long-term growth by the institution. Investment Income Rate (II) is the “income 
expected from the MFI’s financial assets other than the loan portfolio” (p. 4) 
The model above as presented by Rosenberg (2002) is based upon institutionalist 
assumptions directly applied to MFIs following a formal banking model. Welfarist 
organizations may substitute an administrative component that affects the interest rate 
assigned to loans; these organizations replace investment income rate and recover from a 
greater loan loss rate than an institutionalist organization with grants or subsidies in order 
to supplement their operating costs; investment income or equity in this case is equal to 
the rate of subsidization required to maintain operations. This decreases the impact of 
loan losses and administrative expenses associated with the higher volume of loans 
distributed by these organizations; in addition, investment income becomes obsolete as 
many welfarist institutions do not have an equity building element in their balance sheet 
(i.e. every dollar that enters the MFI leaves and any interest earned plus subsidies 
received cover administrative expenses). In other words, the subsidy the welfarist 
organization receives to cover operating costs and loan losses in many ways serves the 
organization in a similar fashion to what investment income provides the institutionalist 
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organization. However, it is assumed that the subsidy received does not fluctuate in the 
same manner that investment income may, given that it is a pre-determined capital 
transfer from the funding organization to the MFI. It may be adjusted as the MFI 
generates increased or decreased levels of profit over time. 
In order to demonstrate this distinction, Table 2.6.1 outlines the adjustments to the 
Rosenberg equation discussed above, adapting it from its original form in order to reflect 
a welfarist philosophy. This is done by adding S to represent subsidies or grants that the 
MFI receives to reduce the impact of loan losses and higher administrative costs 
associated with distributing loans to core poor households; subsidies replace investment 
income in the equation for welfarist institutions. Subsidies, as a fraction of the total 
income, in this scenario are subtracted from the other factors in the same manner as 
investment income.  
Table 2.6.1: Components of Institutionalist and Welfarist MFIs Optimal Interest 
Rate Adapted from Rosenberg Equation 
Institutionalist Interest Rate (MFIh) Welfarist Interest Rate (MFIℓ) 
 
?̂? =  
𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 − 𝐼𝐼
1 − 𝐿𝐿
 
 
 
?̂? =  
𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 − 𝑆
1 − 𝐿𝐿
 
 
 
The chosen interest rate of a MFI is influenced not only by the perceived risk of 
clients but also by the administrative structure of the organization. Institutionalist 
organizations have lower interest rates but lend larger amounts of capital to clients who 
carry less perceived risk of default. In addition, these organizations are predominantly 
profit generating and re-invest these profits into investments in order to increase the 
financial depth of the organization. Welfarist organizations distribute loans at higher 
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interest rates and lend smaller amounts of capital to clients. As these organizations are 
predominantly not-for-profit, they rely on grants to subsidize operations and assist in the 
absorption of loan losses. As the interest rate is linked to the mission of the institution, 
this value and its components can assist in analyzing the overall health of the 
organization and links to the intended outcomes of the organization. 
The variable “Risk Coverage” serves as a proxy for the optimal interest rate of the 
lending institution in the empirical analyses in Chapter Four. However, several elements 
are linked to the administration of loans to the two types of poor. These elements will be 
controlled for by institutional variables including profit margin, gross loan portfolio, and 
operational self-sufficiency, as each of these variables addresses an aspect of Rosenberg’s 
equation; complete definitions of these variables are included in Appendix C. 
Given the distinction between the composition of the optimal interest rate and the 
corresponding components of that rate for each organizational type based upon the 
assumptions of their adopted mission and the profit they need to generate in order to 
maintain operations, the relationship between these factors and the assumed return on the 
loan can be examined by the classification of each MFI and the designation of borrower 
type within the mission. The intended use of the loan and the assumed gross returns on 
the project also become factors influencing the amount a MFI is willing to lend to their 
target demographic, which are linked to the optimal interest rate being used as a 
screening device for the lending institution (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
It is assumed that the two types of borrowers (core poor and entrepreneurial poor) 
will use the capital distributed to them in a different manner, where the MFI assumes a 
loan distributed to the entrepreneurial will be used in a business venture, while capital 
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given to a core poor household has a greater likelihood to be used for consumption 
smoothing over a shorter term. These assumptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
to each group of borrowers but for the sake of this argument loans are distributed in this 
manner.  
For each proposed project by a potential borrower, there is an expected return or 
repayment in a given time period and the assumed risk associated with each individual 
project is correlated with the type of borrower; broadly, this means that the expected 
return for the core poor is less than that of an entrepreneurial poor household and the 
interest rate assigned will be larger to compensate for assumed loss on returns and risk 
associated with the former type of household (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, p. 395). 
Assuming the core poor household uses the loan for consumption smoothing, the lending 
institution will provide them with a smaller loan, as they have a greater risk of default 
and smaller returns on the loan. The entrepreneurial poor will have a higher rate of return 
on the investment and lower risk, compared to the core poor; in this case, it is assumed 
that the MFI will lend the entrepreneurial poor a larger amount of capital at a lower 
interest rate, given this demographic holds less risk. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) discuss credit rationing and the application of this to 
particular demographics. In terms of the target market of the MFI, the endowments held 
by their clients, and the perception of risk associated with each target market, influences 
the amount a MFI may choose to lend to a particular demographic. The discussion of loan 
use and the expected returns for particular types of households relates back to the mission 
of the organization and the institutions’ intended outcomes. It can be assumed that loan 
use and the returns to the funding institution could potentially be more important in the 
46 
lending process for institutionalist organizations because these organizations are seeking 
to maximize their profits in order to be self-sustaining. These institutions will choose to 
lend to the entrepreneurial poor over the core poor. Framed with in the argument laid out 
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), institutionalist MFIs will ration credit between potential 
borrowers, choosing to lend to the entrepreneurial poor over the core poor as this 
demographic carries less risk and it is assumed that they will yield a higher return on 
investment, on average. 
The amount lent to each type of borrower is linked to the assumed risk associated 
with the proposed project or loan use that is funded by the microloan disseminated. An 
additional element in the perception of household risk can be discussed in the relationship 
between the interest rate assigned to a household and the profits generated by the loan 
which go to both the borrower and the lending entity. The household’s initial capital 
endowment also plays a role in this relationship; this can also be framed as collateral. 
Both the lending institution and the household receiving the loan in the subsequent 
discussion are considered risk averse, instead of risk neutral as is assumed in the theory 
outlined by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The collateral associated with a core poor 
household is assumed to be at or close to zero, while entrepreneurial poor households 
have collateral that is greater than core poor households but less than the amount required 
by the formal lending market. This links back to the stock of capital or endowment held 
by each type of household. 
The risk involved with lending to either type of target market is partially 
mitigated by the interest rate assigned to the loan and reflected in the amount of and the 
term of the loan itself, as discussed above. For example, poorer households demand 
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smaller loans at shorter terms and have little to no physical assets that can be used as 
collateral. Therefore, the returns on the project are impacted by the initial amount 
borrowed by the household and the interest rate assigned to that household (?̂?) (also 
assuming here that the MFI can determine the optimal interest rate (𝑟̽� ̽) by which to 
distribute capital to a range of borrowers). The amount borrowed by core poor 
households (ℓ) is less than entrepreneurial poor households (h). The interest rates 
associated with these loans follow the same logic as previously, where the interest rate 
assigned to core poor households is greater than the rate assigned to an entrepreneurial 
poor household. According to this rationale, building on the assumptions of credit 
rationing in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the interest rate of an institution can be used as a 
screening device, where the relationship between the net returns on the loan and the 
amount borrowed are directly related to the collateral held by the household.  
Therefore, one can distinguish between a loan disseminated by either welfarist or 
institutionalist organizations due to the net returns which are allocated to either a core 
poor or entrepreneurial poor households. Assuming that the collateral of core poor 
households is at or close to zero, the net returns to this group will be much less than that 
of the entrepreneurial poor, given the latter has a greater initial endowment and larger 
capital to output ratio, as postulated by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). As both the 
borrower and lending institution are risk averse, ideally each will minimize risk to 
themselves. Along this vein of reasoning, the borrower will not take out a loan it knows it 
cannot repay; the lender will not offer a loan to a household it knows will default.  
In summary of the applications of credit rationing to the type of household and 
classification of MFI, the net return to the core poor borrower is less than the return to the 
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entrepreneurial poor borrower, and similarly, the net return to the lender is smaller from 
the core poor borrower than the entrepreneurial poor borrower, despite the higher interest 
rate of charged by the welfarist institution. Therefore, MFIs holding to an institutionalist 
philosophy of lending will be more likely to lend at a greater rate to entrepreneurial poor 
households compared to core poor households due to the link in their mission to creating 
a financially sustainable organization. The former borrower type holds less risk for the 
lending institution, is more likely to repay their loans, and holds increased potential for 
higher returns on the initial investment compared to the core poor borrower.  
Competition for potential borrowers is increasing across the entire microfinance 
industry, resulting in a price increase across the entire market in terms of costs of 
production because the welfarist MFI (which is assumed to be the baseline theoretical 
institution) no longer has a monopoly in the market (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005; 
Vogelgesang, 2003). Assuming the standard impacts of competition on the market as a 
whole, any cross-subsidization in the form of government or international agency grants 
becomes obsolete because the net losses based upon the new pricing structure cannot be 
covered by this subsidy. On the whole, poorer borrowers are now driven out of the MFI 
market due to the “price” of lending and return to informal lending options in order to 
cover budget shortfalls. 
Each of these elements will be included in the empirical analyses and subsequent 
discussion. As microfinance institutions can determine the risk of households and assign 
a corresponding interest rate based upon the perceived production function of the 
borrower, which is linked to the capital endowments the target market may initially hold, 
risk for the MFI can be mitigated given that information asymmetries are reduced over 
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time. Assuming there are two types of potential loan recipients and two corresponding 
forms of lending institutions, the profit of the latter will vary based upon the demographic 
of borrower targeted by the institution, the interest rate assigned to these borrowers, and 
the average rate of return on the loans disseminated. Given these theoretical assumptions, 
microfinance institutions wishing to maximize their profits, will lend larger loan balances 
to less risky households rather than opting for the higher risk loans at shorter terms and 
decreased returns, which are associated with the entrepreneurial poor and core poor 
respectively. This “drift” towards the institutionalist mindset is manifested through an 
increase in the average loan balance of loans distributed and the major charter or legal 
type entering the market. This specific relationship will be tested in the regression 
analyses to follow in Chapter Four. 
2.7 Institutional Environment and Its Influence on Microfinance 
Beyond the type of borrower and the tools the MFI chooses to utilize in serving 
its target market, the institutional environment also impacts the outcomes of the 
organization, including the degree of governance within financial markets as well as the 
level of political stability within a country. Regulating bodies may choose to implement a 
variety of policies guiding financial markets within a country. In addition, the stability of 
the political climate within a country impacts the ability of such entities to govern and 
inform the regulations of financial markets (Weber, 2004). 
One such monetary tool available to regulators is their ability to regulate the value 
of their currency, in terms of the cost of capital within international markets. The cost of 
capital, which is determined by the formal credit markets, both domestically and 
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internationally, directly influences the profit function of MFIs based upon the selected 
institutional framework and its subsequent assumptions.  
As MFIs have an increased likelihood of return on investment from the 
entrepreneurial poor as opposed to the core poor, many argue that by lending exclusively 
to the former, MFIs assist in increasing the absorptive capacity of a community and in 
turn strengthening the local economy through this practice. This can be attributed to the 
spillover effects or social mobilization generated by employment opportunities through 
the new or enhanced businesses created by micro-loans and the creation of knowledge 
clusters around specific micro-industries (Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters, 2011; 
Maloney, 2002; Dale, 2001; Wibbles, 2006; Zeller and Johanssen, 2006). In the long 
term, these spillover effects provide a contextualized solution to poverty through business 
opportunities, especially for core poor households.  
MFIs serve as a mechanism to strengthen the capital flows to impoverished 
households via semi-formal institutions by assisting in the creation of projects that create 
positive spillover effects in local communities; however, a direct correlation cannot be 
asserted between increased capital endowments of the entrepreneurial poor and the 
assumption that these households will automatically be more productive (Karlan and 
Morduch, 2009). The entrepreneurial poor have increased levels of absorptive capacity, 
given they may have increased skill levels and carry less overall risk than their core poor 
counterparts.  
It becomes necessary to examine a variety of structural characteristics of a 
society, including informal constraints, rule of law and its enforcement, and the 
interaction with societal norms. Institutions become a vital component to sustained 
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growth in the development discussion, as they reduce uncertainty regarding the terms and 
the fulfillment of contracts. Specifically, MFIs can be used by governing entities to foster 
corporate governance programs that build capacity and increase partnerships with 
development partners (Kansiime, 2009). 
In terms of market efficiency and providing capital to the poorest households in a 
country, microfinance can be used as a rudimentary lending technology, which can work 
as an informal development strategy in underdeveloped institutional environments, such 
as those found in the Global South. In this institutional environment, transactions outside 
of the formal market provided by microlending entities can serve as a catalyst for 
building social capital and employment opportunities for poor households, thus positively 
reinforcing the social capital being built by these programs (Dale, 2001; North, 1990; 
Dorward, Kydd, Morrison, and Poulton, 2005).  
Building on the basic assumptions of the impact of knowledge clusters, access to 
capital increases total factor productivity growth for impoverished households who 
access credit through MFIs. These institutions serve as an intermediary for capital 
investment in industries which can potentially increase national absorptive capacity 
within regions, such as business education programs, health insurance, etc. (Maloney, 
2002). Within this framework, increasing the overall quality of life of poor households 
through access to credit may fund human capital building endeavors such as health 
insurance, education expenses, etc. However, as discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter, microfinance institutions, especially those aligning with the institutionalist 
philosophy of lending, are presently targeting specific sub-populations of impoverished 
households such as the entrepreneurial poor in order to reduce the risk absorbed by the 
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lending institution and ensure the future borrowing potential of the organization. This 
links back to the discussion in Section Six regarding the profit function of the household 
and lending institution. 
This capacity to engender sustained growth paths in a community is contingent 
upon the larger institutional environment in which the MFIs operate and the fluidity (or 
restriction) of capital flows to these organizations. The policy framework governing the 
flows of capital can ultimately influence the mission chosen by organizations in a given 
region based upon the regulatory environment.  North (1990) asserts that institutions are 
the vehicle by which individuals determine the value of a transaction and the 
transformation of that exchange for a good or service. Llanto (1998) frames the influence 
of macroeconomic policy on microfinance institutions in terms of the government 
providing the necessary tools and appropriate environment for financial institutions to 
operate so as to promote efficiently functioning markets and increase the overall 
participation of clients in the private sector. In either case, the policy framework 
positively or negatively impacts the ability of organizations to sustain operations and 
influence the population in general.  
If the funding structure of MFIs involves government subsidization, as the policy 
environment can restrict or liberalize the capital flows to the organizations, the type of 
institutional environment can determine the cost of capital which is available to MFIs. In 
the literature, the framework in which these organizations operate ranges from no 
regulatory framework to liberalized semi-formal markets to regulation (e.g. Bolivia & 
Peru) to direct administration (e.g. Bangladesh). This argument would not hold for those 
MFIs reliant upon non-government funds, as the literature suggests that these 
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organizations tend to adopt the welfarist approach and do not focus on building a strict 
equity-based lending model. Quinones and Seibel (2000) recognize that policy is linked 
to the demand for services by poor households; per these authors, as poor households 
demand savings at a greater rate than they do credit, government policies promoting the 
mobilization of financial services to this demographic include:  
...the deregulation of interest rates, permitting financial institutions to offer 
attractive saving products with positive real returns and to charge interest 
rates on loans which cover their costs and risks and allow for a profit 
margin exchange rate deregulation to ease the free flow of private capital 
(p. 423). 
The practitioners of microfinance, regardless of the source of initial capital, are 
left with the challenge of carrying out the mission of the organization in the present 
institutional environment. The rules and regulations outlined in governing policies impact 
the tools used by practitioners and the framework which a development organization, 
such as an MFI, can operate. This interaction ultimately influences the bottom line of the 
lending institution and becomes a necessary component of the discussion surrounding the 
overall shift in the mission of microfinance institutions (Weber, 2004). If operations are 
subsidized by an external source, such as grants, in order to serve a specific population 
such as the core poor, then the transfer of these external funds to the MFIs is influencing 
the execution of the mission. This interaction of the MFI with its institutional 
environment will be tested in Chapter Four through Model Four. 
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2.8 Conclusions 
Overall, it is assumed that microfinance institutions seek to be financially efficient 
organizations while fulfilling their mission. If poor households can create permanent 
businesses which employ community members, this may cause positive spillover effects 
within the local economy that add to the potential long-term growth in a community 
(Hermes, et al., 2011; Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). This also represents a paradigm shift 
within the microfinance community from supply-led, subsidized lines of credit to 
building MFIs that are self-sustaining. This shift also distinguishes between the 
demographic served by each type of MFI as directed by their mission. It is also assumed 
that this form of spillover effects will be contained to the local level, and while this can 
have a positive effect on the overall macroeconomy, it represents an increase in the 
robustness of local economies as opposed to the broader economy, in a bottom up 
fashion. 
The rift within microfinance affects the outcomes of these organizations. The 
schism of microfinance manifests itself through the chosen mission of the organization 
and the outcomes associated with each particular type of mission. This split between 
rhetoric and action may be attributed to the natural evolution or life-cycle of 
microfinance institutions but is also a product of the distinction of a particular target 
market that these organizations serve, the desired profit from the distribution of capital 
held by the funding entity, and the institutional environment. This tension is not 
contained only to microfinance institutions but can be seen in many development based 
organizations, seeking to reduce poverty on a global scale. 
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The optimal interest rate and its components, also a reflection of the mission of 
the organization, inform the discussion of the manner in which microfinance institutions 
are evolving on an individual level, from welfarist to institutionalist, and also as an entire 
industry. The institutional frameworks in which these organizations operate also impact 
the outcomes and inputs of MFIs. The next chapter outlines the data used to test the 
relationship between the average loan balances of organizations, whether welfarist or 
institutionalist organizations, and the variables that inform the discussion surrounding the 
characteristics discussed in the present chapter, which  influence the outcomes of the 
chosen mission of an organization. 
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Chapter Three: Data and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to illustrate the shift in the lending ideology of microfinance as an 
industry, the subsequent analyses will use Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc. 
(“MIXMarket”) data to assess the linkages between the charter or legal status of MFIs 
and the type of mission which these organizations purport to carry out. This is also 
reflected in the average loan balance of an organization, or the average amount lent by 
specific MFIs to households, as those MFIs concerned with organizational sustainability 
will lend larger loan balances to less risky households.  
This “drift” towards the institutionalist mindset is manifested through an increase 
in the average loan balance of loans distributed as an industry. This leads to the main 
research question used as the foundation for analysis: given that a positive, overall shift 
in average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact 
microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive 
margins? The goal of this section and the analyses in Chapter Four is to better understand 
what factors affect the manifestation of the mission of microfinance organizations and 
what specific characteristics of these organizations have the greatest degree of impact, 
ranging from internal characteristics to the institutional environment. 
3.2 Data 
The data used in this analysis were downloaded from MIXMarket 
(mixmarket.org), which is produced by the Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc., a 
collaboration of multiple global partners such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
CGAP, and Citi Foundation. The resource provides a self-reported, voluntary sample of 
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microfinance institutions for multiple years. This sample might or might not be 
representative of the overall population of MFIs in the world, and that cannot be assessed 
using these data alone. For purposes of summary statistics, the MFIs in the sample might 
be larger or better organized, which would be the standard expectation about institutions 
that voluntarily report data. The following summary statistics, therefore, are subject to 
bias as a result, as smaller institutions are more than likely omitted due to the reduced 
levels of administrative capacity which these organizations presently hold. This produces 
a speculative effect on the average loan balance as remitted by the organizations in this 
sample, although the theory that institutions which are larger make larger loans would 
imply a bias toward larger loan size.   
For multivariate models, however, the matter is different. If the explanatory 
variables adequately explain the dependent variables (average loan balance in level and 
change), and if there is no selection bias—unmeasured tendency to report data that is 
related to average loan balance—then the regressions are not subject to bias. Thus, the 
issue is the adequacy of the specified models, and the data could be considered entirely 
satisfactory for that exercise. There is no obvious reason why MFIs would have 
unmeasured causes linked to high or low or changing loan balances, as these institutions 
are not like idiosyncratic people. 
In the self-reported data, the MFIs select which legal type as defined by 
MIXMarket most closely resembles the present mission of the organization. 
Organizations also submit categories of data including: infrastructure, loan portfolio, 
credit products provided, and funding liabilities. These data are then validated by 
MIXMarket analysts following the Universal Standards for Social Performance created 
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and disseminated by the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF). In addition, the values 
submitted by MFIs are adjusted for inflation in a series of four analytical adjustments 
which are applied across the submission and account for “the effects of inflation on the 
real value of monetary balances” (MIXMarket FAQs, 2013). 
Endogeneity may be present in these data as a result of the method of compiling 
the data. As the data is self-reporting, there may be entry errors in the data submitted or 
MFIs submit data that has been slightly altered from reality. This data set is not a random 
sample selection due to the nature of submission; it can be seen in the data that once one 
MFI in a specific country or region begin to submit information to MixMarket, others in 
the area follow suit, creating a diffusion-esque effect. The information remitted by these 
organizations represents those MFIs who have specific characteristics in common, 
including support staff and administration that can record and maintain the information 
required to submit to MIXMarket. As this is the case, those MFIs with low overhead 
costs may not have the resources to submit data to the clearinghouse.  
The sample used for the following empirical analyses ranges between the years of 
1995 and 2011 and includes 2,251 microfinance institutions in 118 countries from 
emerging and transitional economies. The number of MFIs is not constant throughout the 
panel, as new MFIs are formed and begin reporting to MIXMarket, while others 
discontinue reporting over time. The MIX provides regional classifications for the 
countries included in the sample, including Africa (Sub-Saharan), East Asia and the 
Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and The Caribbean, Middle East 
and North Africa, and South Asia. In addition, MFIs are classified by charter (legal) type 
are defined Bank, Credit Union/Cooperative, Non-Bank Financial Institution, Non-
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Government Organization, Rural Banks, and Other (See Table 3.3.2). No MFIs in the 
data set change legal type across the panel as submitted to MIXMarket.  
The date established was added to the original data downloaded; this was obtained 
from the profile pages that MIXMarket creates for each institution on their website. This 
information was trimmed by 1% on the bottom (negative numbers only), as several MFIs 
submitted a date established entry that was newer than the years of data submitted. For 
example, VFS of India submitted data for fiscal years from 2002 through 2005, but 
declared the date the organization was established to be 1/23/2006. In such a case, the 
date established was adjusted to the first year of submission; this was done for 117 
observations in the data. Appendix A shows the complete list of negative date 
submissions that were changed in the data, including the original date established as 
submitted by the institutions and the years of data submitted by the organizations. For 
those organizations that did not remit a “date established” on their profile page, the date 
was set as January 1 of the first year the organization submitted data to MIXMarket. This 
was done for 130 organizations and a complete list of these organizations is listed in 
Appendix B. 
Several institutions discontinue remitting information to MIXMarket across the 
panel used in this analysis. Many of these organizations submit a reason for this 
suspension of submission in the notes section of their profile page as to why this occurs; 
Table 3.2.1 (next page) provides a short list of example MFIs which provide such notes. 
In addition to MFIs dropping out of the data, 32 MFIs submitted duplicate information 
for specific years in the data, which were removed or corrected per the profile page 
information. Many organizations submitted updated information for a specific quarter in 
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the year (e.g. quarter one of 2012 which was recorded as data for year 2011) or changed 
the ending date of the fiscal year which resulted in a double submission for the specific 
year; such cases were dropped from the data set and the annual submission was retained 
(organizations can distinguish the time period of the submission and is included as a 
column in the dataset [quarter versus annual records]). 
Table 3.2.1: Examples of and reasons why MFIs drop out of the data over time* 
Name Country Reason Provided 
Fundsz Mikro Poland “...all funds absorbed by FM Bank in 
Poland...” 
Barakot Uzbekistan “Operations have been suspended.” 
Pride Zambia “Institution is no longer operational.” 
Koshi Yomuti ELO Namibia 
“Institutional no longer operational as of 
12.31.2009” 
*Information obtained from profile pages of these specific MFIs at: http://www.mixmarket.org/profiles-reports 
3.3 Summary Statistics and Basic MFI Information 
The main indicators reflecting the present literature discussing mission drift 
within microfinance institutions are the average loan balance of the institution and the 
interest rate charged by the institution, which, in these data, is proxied by risk coverage in 
the empirical analyses. These variables also serve as a gauge of the overall health of the 
organization, in terms of carrying out the intended or assumed outcomes of the 
organization, whether institutionalist or welfarist. The table below outlines the charter or 
legal types as defined by MIXMarket, along with the organizational umbrella under 
which each falls in accordance with the basic definition. These classifications will be 
used throughout the empirical analyses.  
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Table 3.3.2. Charter Type Definitions of Microfinance Institutions 
 Charter (Legal) Type Definition 
In
st
itu
tio
na
lis
t O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 
Bank A licensed financial intermediary regulated by a 
state banking supervisory agency. It may provide 
any of a number of financial services, such as 
deposit taking, lending, payment services, and 
money transfers. 
Non Bank Financial Institution 
(NBFI) 
An institution that provides similar services to those 
of a Bank, but is licensed under a separate category. 
The separate license may be due to lower capital 
requirements, to limitations on financial service 
offerings, or to supervision under a different state 
agency. In some countries this corresponds to a 
special category created for microfinance 
institutions. 
Rural Bank Banking institution that targets clients who live and 
work in non-urban areas and who are generally 
involved in agricultural-related activities. 
 
W
el
fa
ris
t O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 
Non Government Organization 
(NGO) 
An organization registered as a nonprofit for tax 
purposes or some other legal charter. Its financial 
services are usually more restricted, usually not 
including deposit taking. These institutions are 
typically not regulated by a banking supervisory 
agency. 
Credit Union/Cooperative A nonprofit, member-based financial intermediary. 
It may offer a range of financial services, including 
lending and deposit taking, for the benefit of its 
members. While not regulated by a state banking 
supervisory agency, it may come under the 
supervision of regional or national cooperative 
council. 
 Other* Organization whose services are not encapsulated 
by the definitions of other charter types, as 
classified by the MFI when data are submitted. 
Definitions from MIXMarket glossary 
*Other is a legal type used in the data set but the definition is not provided in the MIXMarket glossary 
Institutionalist organizations, classified in these data as Banks, NBFIs or Rural 
Banks, will have a higher average loan balance and lower interest rate than welfarist 
organizations (NGOs and Credit Union/Cooperatives) due to their increased likelihood of 
lending to the entrepreneurial poor. Although interest rate is not included as an 
explanatory variable, as this information is not included in these data, its components, as 
62 
presented in Rosenberg’s (2002) equation are and will be used as one of the primary 
explanatory variables in Models One through Four. 
Tables 3.3.3, 3.3.4, and 3.3.5  include basic summary statistics for the five main 
descriptive variables used in the subsequent regression analyses which are Average Loan 
Balance, Profit Margin, Gross Loan Portfolio, Risk Coverage, and Operational Self-
Sufficiency; the latter two tables display the information for only institutionalist 
organizations and welfarist organizations, respectively. Basic definitions of these 
variables are included in the footnotes on the subsequent pages while full definitions are 
provided in Appendix C.  
Average loan balance serves as the main dependent variable in the subsequent 
regressions, as it is assumed that higher values of this variables indicate a scaling up of 
operations of the organization while reaching fewer clients (Hermes, Lensink, and 
Meesters, 2011). Profit Margin, Gross Loan Portfolio and Operational Self Sufficiency 
provide a gauge of the health of the organization, in terms of long term sustainability 
measures, which overall support the institutionalist framework of microfinance. Risk 
Coverage serves as a proxy variable for interest rate, as the latter value is not provided in 
the MIXMarket data; as a ratio of loss and the percentage of the overall portfolio at risk 
of default, risk coverage gives an rough estimate of the interest rate that an organization 
would need to set in order to cover loan losses, taking into account the estimated risk of 
the clientele.  
Each of the five variables in the tables below covers a portion of the formula 
outlined by Rosenberg (2002), which is discussed at length in the review of the 
theoretical literature in Chapter Two. The individual components of these variables were 
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not provided by MIXMarket in these data (e.g. Operating Income, Financial Revenue, 
Impairment Allowance, etc.), hence the use of the variables generated by these 
components in an attempt to replicate the variables included in Rosenberg’s original 
formula (e.g. Administrative Expense Rate, Loan Loss Rate, etc.). 
The average loan balance disseminated by institutionalist organizations is 2.5 
times as great as of welfarist organizations in these data. Compared to institutionalist 
organizations, welfarist organizations generate a greater rate of profit, although the MFI 
industry, estimated in these data, as a whole posts a loss, based upon the ratio of 
operating expenses and total financial revenue of the contributing organizations.  
 
Table 3.3.3: Summary Statistics for MFIs (All) 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Average Loan Balance ($US)1 
Obs:   11,493 
n:         2,179 $1,579 $20,359 0 $1,531,625 
Profit Margin2 Obs:   10,930 
n:         2,040 
-4.21 350.74 -35,495 729.88 
Gross Loan Portfolio 3 
(scaled by $100,000) 
Obs:   12,406 
n:         2,233 $328.67 $3,065 0 $185,231 
Risk Coverage4 Obs:     8,671 
n:         1,842 
2,096.58 96,770 -3.83 4,728,662 
Operational Self Sufficiency 
(%)5 
Obs:   11,174 
n:         2,101 
1.17 1.28 -2.94 81.22 
 
  
                                                          
1 Average Loan Balance: Total value of outstanding loans divided by the number of clients served by the 
MFI 
2 Profit Margin:  the ratio of Operating Income and Financial Revenue 
3 Gross Loan Portfolio: All outstanding principal for all outstanding client loans, including current, 
delinquent and restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off. It does not include interest 
receivable. It does not include employee loans. 
4 Risk Coverage: The ratio of Impairment Allowance and the Portfolio at Risk > 30 days 
5 Operational Self Sufficiency: Financial Revenue / (Financial Expense + Impairment Loss + Operating 
Expense) 
64 
 
Table 3.3.4: Summary Statistics for MFIs (Institutionalist Organizations Only) 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Average Loan Balance ($US) 
Obs:     5,147 
n:            955 
$2,373 $30,229 0 $1,531,625 
Profit Margin 
Obs:     4,900 
n:            895 -9.03 523.79 -35,495 729.88 
Gross Loan Portfolio  
(scaled by $100,000) 
Obs:     5,566 
n:             979 
$604.21 $4,528 0 $185,231 
Risk Coverage 
Obs:     3,940 
n:             813 3,526.15 127,581 -3.83 4,728,662 
Operational Self Sufficiency 
(%) 
Obs:     4,975 
n:            910 
1.18 1.12 -2.95 66.34 
 
Table 3.3.5: Summary Statistics for MFIs (Welfarist Organizations Only) 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Average Loan Balance ($US) 
Obs:     6,237 
n:         1,188 $931 $2,963 0 $102,250 
Profit Margin Obs:     5,944 
n:         1,120 
-0.27 7.01 -413.32 24.59 
Gross Loan Portfolio  
(scaled by $100,000) 
Obs:     6,720 
n:         1,217 
$105.85 $493.05 0 $14,084 
Risk Coverage 
Obs:     4,659 
n:         1,006 919.97 60,517 -1.96 4,129,682 
Operational Self Sufficiency 
(%) 
Obs:     6,102 
n:          1,163 
1.15 1.39 -1.27 81.22 
 
As seen in the tables above, there is a distinct difference in the variables between 
institutionalist and welfarist organizations (charter type “other” was not included in 
Tables 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). This is explored further in Table 3.3.6 (proceeding pages) in 
which the variables above are displayed by charter or legal type. This table also includes 
the number of active borrowers, offices, years of operation, age, scale, region, regulated, 
profit status, and target market. Years of operation is a variable generated by the author 
that indicates the number of years in which a MFI has provided services to clients. This 
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value was calculated by subtracting the year established, as submitted on the 
organizations’ profile page, from the years that data were submitted on behalf of the 
organization. 
Age is a categorical variable calculated by MIXMarket staff and indicates if the 
MFI is new, young or mature; this variable does not consistently match up with the 
“years of operation” created by the author. Scale is a categorical variable which attempts 
to demonstrate the breadth of services offered by the MFI in terms of the operations, 
including small, medium, and large scale operations; this variable changes across time as 
MFIs grow. Regions, as classified by MIXMarket, are Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and 
the Pacific, Latin America and The Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and 
South Asia; a complete list of countries included from each region is included in 
Appendix C.  
Three additional categorical variables are included as they indicate characteristics 
of the either the welfarist or institutionalist philosophy of microfinance provision. 
“Regulated” allows organizations to indicate if parameters guiding formal market pertain 
to the governance of their organization by selecting yes or no; one can assume that those 
that are regulated will adhere more closely to the institutionalist ideology; in addition, 
there is a link in the literature to the degree of regulation and the overall wealth of the 
borrower, where more highly regulated MFIs tend to lend at a greater rate to wealthier 
clients (Hartarska and Mersland, 2012). MFIs also indicate whether they fall within the 
non-profit or for-profit realm through the variable “Profit Status”; this variable does not 
change across time. Via “Target Market,” MFIs select if the services provided by the 
organization are broad, high end, low end, or small business which is classified within the 
66 
depth of services provided as a ratio of the average loan balance per borrower to the GNI 
per Capita; this may change throughout the panel of years in these data (e.g. KredAqro 
NBCO lists its Target Market as Small Business, High End, and Broad across the total 
years of submission). Full definitions for all variables included in Tables 3.3.3 through 
3.3.6, including definitions of their basic components, are provided in Appendix C. 
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Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type 
 
 Charter (Legal) Type 
 Bank Cooperative/ Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Other 
Average Loan 
Balance  
Obs: 
n:      
1,008 
181 
Obs: 
n:      
1,764 
429 
Obs: 
n:      
3,493 
360 
Obs: 
n:      
4,473 
759 
Obs: 
n:      
646 
114 
Obs: 
n:      
109 
36 
Mean: 2,235 Mean:  1,766 Mean:  2,667 Mean:  602 Mean:  994 Mean:  1,181 
S.D.:  3,353 S.D.: 3,586 S.D.: 36,484 S.D.: 2,606 S.D.: 8,006 S.D.: 2,167 
Max:  29,931 Max: 102,250 Max: 1,531,625 Max: 76,433 Max: 203,315 Max: 15,708 
Min:  0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 14 
Profit Margin 
Obs: 
n:      
958 
153 
Obs: 
n:      
1,742 
403 
Obs: 
n:      
3,260 
593 
Obs: 
n:      
4,202 
717 
Obs: 
n:      
682 
149 
Obs: 
n:      
86 
25 
Mean:  -46.61 Mean: -0.14 Mean: -0.13 Mean -0.33 Mean: 1.23 Mean: -2.19 
S.D.: 1,184.09 S.D.: 1.96 S.D.: 5.89 S.D.: 8.24 S.D.: 27.94 S.D.: 16.69 
Max: 108.08 Max: 1.64 Max: 298.29 Max: 243.59 Max: 729.88 Max: 21.77 
Min: -
35,495.63 
Min: -50.42 Min: -89.87 Min: -413.32 Min: -3.15 Min: -
151.16 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio (scaled 
by $100,000) 
Obs: 
n:      
2,123 
191 
Obs: 
n:      
2,019 
449 
Obs: 
n:      
3,710 
636 
Obs: 
n:      
4,701 
768 
Obs: 
n:      
733 
152 
Obs: 
n:      
120 
37 
Mean: 2,198.54 Mean: 141.47 Mean: 217.35 Mean: 90.55 Mean: 119.66 Mean: 26.64 
S.D.: 9,822.93 S.D.: 714.98 S.D.: 679.82 S.D.: 356.74 S.D.: 908.95 S.D.: 38.16 
Max: 185,231.3 Max: 14,084.59 Max: 11,753 Max: 6,479 Max: 17,399 Max: 199.65 
Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0.004 Min: 0 
Risk Coverage 
Obs: 
n:      
735 
132 
Obs: 
n:      
1,267 
356 
Obs: 
n:      
2,671 
543 
Obs: 
n:      
3,392 
650 
Obs: 
n:      
534 
138 
Obs: 
n:      
72 
23 
Mean: 3.53 Mean: 1.44 Mean:  5,198 Mean: 1,263 Mean: 9.71 Mean: 4.16 
S.D.: 35.52 S.D.: 14.91 S.D.: 154,934 S.D.: 70,925 S.D.: 112.15 S.D.: 8.72 
Max: 953.55 Max: 486.71 Max: 4,728,662 Max: 4,129,682 Max: 2,477.32 Max: 49.96 
Min: -3.83 Min: -1.96 Min: -0.68 Min: -1.06 Min: 0 Min: 0 
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Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type (continued) 
 Charter (Legal) Type 
 Bank Cooperative/ Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Other 
Operational 
Self Sufficiency 
(%) 
Obs: 
n:      
969 
157 
Obs: 
n:      
1,773 
414 
Obs: 
n: 
3,316 
603 
Obs: 
n:      
4,329 
749 
Obs: 
n:      
690 
150 
Obs: 
n:      
97 
28 
Mean: 1.19 Mean: 1.18 Mean: 1.17 Mean: 1.15 Mean: 1.24 Mean: 1.25 
S.D.: 2.16 S.D.: 1.07 S.D.: 0.70 S.D.: 1.50 S.D.: 0.26 S.D.: 2.04 
Max: 66.33 Max: 31.96 Max: 15.037 Max: 81.22 Max: 2.82 Max: 20.41 
Min: -2.94 Min: 0.0194 Min: -0.68 Min: -1.27 Min: 0.002 Min: 0.065 
Number of 
Active 
Borrowers 
Obs: 
n:      
1,029 
102 
Obs: 
n:      
1,778 
431 
Obs: 
n:      
3,523 
631 
Obs: 
n:      
4,516 
761 
Obs: 
n:      
647 
145 
Obs: 
n:      
110 
36 
Mean: 187,593 Mean: 11,554 Mean: 54,094 Mean: 53,459 Mean: 13,559 Mean: 9,412 
S.D.: 800,967 S.D.: 46,054 S.D.: 265,904 S.D.: 328,20
3 
S.D.: 25,378 S.D.: 19,47
6 
Max
: 
8,519,497 Max: 852,925 Max: 6,242,26
6 
Max: 6,397,6
35 
Max: 311,38
0 
Max: 142,8
14 
Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 28 Min: 0 
Offices 
Obs: 
n:      
706 
177 
Obs: 
n:      
1096 
375 
Obs: 
n:      
2,362 
565 
Obs: 
n:      
2,815 
625 
Obs: 
n:      
494 
137 
Obs: 
n:      
71 
30 
Mean: 86 Mean: 20 Mean: 35 Mean: 45 Mean: 13 Mean: 13 
S.D.: 296 S.D.: 49 S.D.: 127 S.D.: 213 S.D.: 31 S.D.: 24 
Max: 4,591 Max: 522 Max: 2,380 Max: 3,334 Max: 372 Max: 123 
Min: 1 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 0 Min: 1 
Years in 
Operation* 
n: 187 n: 428 n: 607 n: 717 n: 140 n: 37 
 10.84  12.16  7.85  12.32  20.52  6.92 
Age Obs: n: 
282 
189 
Obs: 
n: 
612 
429 
Obs: 
n: 
1,061 
618 
Obs: 
n: 
1,093 
727 
Obs: 
n: 
175 
145 
Obs: 
n: 
52 
37 
New 115 155 383 205 19 22 
Young 72 192 370 321 27 16 
Mature 95 265 308 567 129 14 
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Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type (continued) 
 Charter (Legal) Type 
 Bank Cooperative/ Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Other 
Scale Obs: n: 
279 
191 
Obs: 
n: 
601 
449 
Obs: 
n: 
1,051 
636 
Obs: 
n: 
1,163 
768 
Obs: 
n: 
221 
152 
Obs: 
n: 
48 
37 
Small 99 355 493 679 107 32 
Medium 65 166 325 327 77 11 
Large 115 80 233 157 37 5 
Region n: 193 n: 450 n: 637 n: 771 n: 153 n: 37 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
(n: 587) 83 173 144 141 40 6 
East Asia and 
the Pacific  
(n: 292) 11 33 31 105 103 9 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia  
(n: 414) 39 130 198 40 0 7 
Latin America 
and The 
Caribbean 
(n: 502) 
37 83 162 216 0 4 
Middle East and 
North Africa  
(n:   73) 5 0 9 56 0 3 
South Asia  (n: 373) 18 31 93 213 10 8 
Regulated n:  188 n:  42
2 
n: 620 n:  726 n:  145 n:  37 
Yes 186 291 437 221 136 23 
No 2 131 183 505 9 14 
Profit Status n:  183 n:  40
2 
n: 613 n:  720 n:  145 n:  24 
Non-Profit 4 384 102 717 16 11 
Profit 179 14 511 3 129 13 
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*This variable only includes MFIs reporting a date established on the profile page for the organization. Those MFIs in which the years operated was generated by the author are not 
included in this information. 
 
Table 3.3.6: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type (continued) 
 
 Charter (Legal) Type 
 Bank Cooperative/ Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Other 
Target Market Obs: 
n:  
1,030 
182 
Obs: 
n:  
1,794 
437 
Obs: 
n:  
3,484 
630 
Obs: 
n:  
4,480 
759 
Obs: 
n:  
647 
144 
Obs: 
n:  
110 
36 
Broad 483 1097 1745 1284 452 65 
High End 129 172 176 72 30 5 
Low End 241 369 1376 3075 153 37 
Small Business 177 156 187 49 12 3 
 
71 
As discussed throughout the review of literature and theoretical assumptions 
surrounding microfinance, a difference exists in the services offered to poor households 
between the welfarist and institutionalist philosophy of lending. This is framed in terms 
of the intended outcome of these organizations, which are categorized in this data set as 
legal or charter type, and manifests itself through the fulfillment of an organization’s 
mission. This is measured in these organizations by the size of average loan balance. In 
line with the theoretical considerations of this piece, welfarist organizations will lend 
smaller loans to a greater number of borrowers, while institutionalist organizations will 
lend larger amounts to fewer borrowers. Core poor households are predominantly served 
by welfarist institutions, while institutionalist organizations target individuals and 
households that comprise the entrepreneurial poor. There is a direct correlation between 
the type of charter status a MFI selects to reflect its mission, the corresponding average 
loan balance, and the target market it serves at the given time. As seen in the summary 
statistics above (Table 3.3.6), NBFIs and Banks have the largest average loan balance 
compared to NGOs and Cooperatives and Credit Unions, which supports the basic 
premise that institutionalist organizations will, on average, disseminate larger loan 
balances compared to welfarist institutions. 
Across the panel of data, average loan balance is increasing for all MFI types. The 
direction of change of average loan balance between years was also calculated and the 
results indicate that this variable is increasing more frequently than it is decreasing across 
time regardless of the charter type for the MFI, as is seen in Table 3.3.7 below. For the 
MFIs contributing information to MIXMarket, it seems that in 68% of the paired 
observations average loan balance is increasing, while 27% of these pairs decrease across 
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time. This variable will be used in the Model Three (outlined in the subsequent sections), 
in order to better understand the relationship between the direction of change of average 
loan balance and explanatory variables. 
Table 3.3.7: Direction of Change of Average Loan Balance (ALB) by Charter Type 
Charter Type Decreasing ALB No Change in ALB Increasing ALB 
Bank 
238 
(29%) 
6 
(<1%) 
570 
(70%) 
Credit Union/Coop 378 
(29%) 
3 
(<1%) 
905 
(70%) 
NBFI 
894 
(32%) 
29 
(1%) 
1,896 
(67%) 
NGO 1,142 
(31%) 
58 
(2%) 
2,458 
(67%) 
Rural Bank 
121 
(25%) 
7 
(1%) 
352 
(73%) 
Other 
25 
(36%) 
0 
(--) 
44 
(64%) 
Total 2,798 
(30%) 
103 
(1%) 
6,225 
(68%) 
 
In addition to the average loan balance and the direction of change of average 
loan balance, years in operation becomes an important indicator of mission drift because 
the literature suggests, per the evolution of microfinance hypothesis, which states as 
MFIs age they align more closely with the institutionalist or outcome based philosophy of 
lending rather than a welfarist ideology. Therefore, as MFIs age they will be more likely 
to align with the institutionalist philosophy regardless of charter type; they will not 
change charter type but it is assumed that the outcomes of older organizations will 
resemble an institutionalist rather than a welfarist perspective.  
However, there may be a second layer of organizational evolution, in that, those 
organizations reporting to MIXMarket that are also considered young are selecting a 
charter type that reflects an institutionalist philosophy, as the industry itself, as it evolves, 
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now predominantly reflects this viewpoint. Table 3.3.8 (below) shows that, for the MFIs 
reporting to MIXMarket, Banks and NBFIs have steadily increased in terms of volume in 
recent years, while NGOs are decreasing and Credit Unions are remaining at similar 
levels across time. This indicates, that as an industry, MFIs are now entering the 
microfinance industry at a greater rate under the umbrella of outcome and sustainability 
driven microbanking. 
Table 3.3.8: Count of Observations of the Age of MFIs Institutionalist versus 
Welfarist Organizations by Legal Type Reporting to MIXMarket 
 
Institutionalist (n: 934) Welfarist (n: 1,145) 
Years in Operation 
Bank 
(Obs: 1130 
 n: 187) 
NBFI 
(Obs: 3652 
 n: 607) 
Rural 
Bank 
(Obs: 725 
 n: 140) 
NGO 
(Obs: 4571 
 n: 717) 
Credit 
Union 
(Obs: 1993 
 n: 428) 
0-5 447 1612 83 955 582 
6-10 237 1022 104 1168 562 
11-15 198 605 157 1102 438 
16-20 123 245 81 716 142 
21-25 52 102 52 345 46 
26-30 27 31 67 145 30 
31-40 25 23 106 98 90 
41-50 6 8 57 27 93 
Greater than 50 15 4 18 15 9 
 
Rural banks report the greatest profit margin compared to the other charter types 
in these data, with Banks posting the lowest degree of profit. In theory, it is assumed that 
institutionalist organizations will post a higher margin of profit compared to welfarist 
organizations; other than rural banks, all MFI legal types in this sample post a negative 
profit margin. In addition to profit margin, risk coverage can indicate the overall health of 
the organization, as this variable includes the ratio of the loan portfolio which is at risk of 
default, in terms of loan loss impairment and the percentage of missed payments for 
thirty day increments (i.e. the greater the value of this ratio the riskier the portfolio).  
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Number of active borrowers is included as an explanatory variable because it 
links to a mission determined factor, in which it is assumed that welfarist organizations 
will lend smaller loan balances to a greater number of clients, while institutionalist 
organizations will lend larger loan balances to a smaller number of clients. The number 
of offices also speaks to a similar relationship to mission philosophy as does number of 
active borrowers. Theoretically, welfarist institutions will have a greater number of 
offices compared to their institutionalist counterparts, as a means of the former reaching a 
broader client base than the latter; this can also influence factors such as profit margin 
and operational self-sufficiency as the overhead costs of welfarist organizations will be 
greater due to the volume of offices it maintains.  
Several categorical variables are included as explanatory variables, as they assist 
in the explanation and links to intended mission outcomes. Per previous discussion 
regarding the evolution of microfinance, it is assumed that those MFIs classified as 
“mature” in terms of their age will have a greater likelihood to adhere to an 
institutionalist philosophy. Within the variable target market, there seems to be the most 
movement between categories that institutions are reporting across the panel. Per the 
definitions of the groups for target market, it seems that high end and small business best 
align with the institutionalist philosophy of lending, while low end aligns with welfarist; 
broad is an all-encompassing category that many MFIs seem to be switching to over time 
in the panel. The entrance of or switch to broad may also indicate external pressure to 
increase inclusion of an extensive range of clients by board members or funding agencies. 
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3.4 Links to Concepts and Theory 
The concept of a MFI being institutionalist or welfarist refers to its actual 
emphasis on the core poor or entrepreneurial poor as the target demographic of the 
organization. There is not a single variable in these data that matches the reflection of the 
organization’s mission exactly, therefore, charter or legal type is a proxy for this. While 
there can be some uncertainty about the goals of an institution, and mission drift can 
occur on the internal or external margin, which is the point of this research; a bank is 
clearly different from an NGO or credit union or cooperative, in terms of the target 
market of the organization and the services offered. 
The targeting of particular demographic groups is a basic concept in categorizing 
MFIs. In this case, a self-reported variable is available in the data, namely “target 
market,” which is small business, high end, broad, or low end. This variable changes over 
time for individual MFIs in the sample used; as such, it can represent the dynamic 
changes in particular MFIs choosing to serve a particular demographic. This can also 
represent mission drift as a MFI may move from designating “low end” to “broad” as 
their target demographic. 
The mission of the organization, in general, and drift within the mission of the 
institution are reflected within average loan balance. In this case, all MFI research is 
based on the idea that the core poor differ in their uses of loans and in their receiving 
smaller loans on average, while the entrepreneurial poor receive larger loans on average. 
The use of average loan balance is well established as the measure of the concept of 
mission (Hishigsuren, 2007; Morduch and Haley, 2002; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). 
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The subsequent analyses will test the theory and related main hypothesis that 
MFIs with larger average loan balances are also serving households closer to the 
subsistence poverty level (considered the entrepreneurial poor in the theoretical section), 
as opposed to those considered the core poor. The first model is a basic OLS, fixed 
effects regression model testing the relationship between average loan balance and the 
explanatory variables, as outlined above, that most reflect the mission of the organization, 
whether it is classified as institutionalist or welfarist, including gross loan portfolio, 
number of active borrowers, age, etc.  
An increase in average loan balance can be seen the summary statistics across all 
legal types, which indicates at first pass that all MFIs are moving more towards an 
institutionalist perspective of lending; this is the basic premise of mission drift in this 
analysis. The phenomenon of mission drift directly impacts the rationale used in 
advocating for microfinance in impoverished and/or rural communities, as the mission of 
these institutions more often than not falls within the welfarist approach to microfinance, 
especially those aligning with the not-for-profit ideology. In addition, as discussed in the 
theory section and previously in this chapter, one could assume that welfarist 
organizations will disseminate small loans to poorer households while institutionalist 
organizations lend larger amounts of capital to less poor households. However, in these 
data it seems that regardless of institution type (which is not changing across time) 
average loan balance is increasing over time. This rate of change will be examined in the 
second fixed effects model, as the first difference of the dependent variable will be 
regressed against the outlined explanatory variables. 
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Model Three, again, utilizes a transformed dependent variable, where the 
direction of change between years, classified as decreasing (-1), unchanged (0), or 
increasing (+1), will be used to explain the overall shift in average loan balance in terms 
of the chosen explanatory variables. The final model takes into account macro-level 
variables (defined in Appendix D) in order to control for factors that influence a 
microfinance institution’s financial and organizational environment, which are 
considered benchmark indicators of development and institutional stability throughout a 
country, including variables from the World Bank and Polity IV Stability index. 
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Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Returning to the basic research question and taking into account how the baseline 
statistics discussed in Chapter Three reflect the differences regarding the legal status of 
institutions, we can now proceed to the discussion surrounding the rationale for the 
subsequent regression analyses. To reiterate, the basic research question is: given that a 
positive, overall shift in average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, 
how does this impact microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the 
intensive and extensive margins? This question, though seemingly simple, becomes quite 
complex when discussing the population served, the measures of organizational 
sustainability and the institutional environment, and the intended outcomes of the 
organization.  
As discussed at length in the theoretical section of the review of literature, a 
“schism” exists between the mission of the organization and the actual outcomes of 
microfinance organizations, framed in terms of loans disseminated to individual 
households (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Welfarist institutions, categorized as 
NGOs or Cooperative/Credit Unions in these analyses, will lend at a greater rate to 
poorer households, while institutionalist organizations such as Banks or NBFIs will lend 
to less poor households. In the mission rhetoric of these organizations, each specifically 
defines its intended outcome but these intended results may or may not become reality in 
the day to day operations of the organization for a variety of reasons. 
Average loan balance, as provided by MIXMarket, serves as an indicator of the 
degree to which the MFI is carrying out its assumed mission. In this respect, welfarist 
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institutions will have a lower average loan balance as compared to institutionalist 
organizations. While not all organizations fall cleanly into either category, there is a trend 
across the data, as seen in the summary statistics in the previous chapter (Table 3.3.6). 
The first regression model, below, shows the basic unit change analysis between average 
loan balance and the explanatory variables listed. Each explanatory variable indicates an 
aspect of the categorization of the MFIs in these data, in terms of the organizational 
structure and its relationship to the clients of the organization. Based upon the literature, 
it is assumed that welfarist institutions will profit less, have smaller loan portfolios, have 
riskier portfolios, and be less self-sufficient in terms of monthly operations, as compared 
to institutionalist organizations. 
4.2 Fixed Effects Regressions 
The following four models use average loan balance and basic transformations of 
this variable to better inform the discussion surrounding mission drift in microfinance 
institutions, while controlling for variables that reflect the administration of loans to 
clients of the organization.  
4.2.a Model One 
The following model estimates the degree of interaction between the average loan 
balance of the organization against specific characteristics of the organizations that 
influence the intended outcomes of the institution, controlling for the charter type, region, 
scale, level of regulation, profit status, and target market of each specific MFI; within 
these categorical variables, the omitted or control variables are, respectively: new, bank, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, small, yes, for-profit, and broad. The number of observations for the 
“offices” variable was significantly less than that of other variables (originally 7,544 
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observations compared to 11,492). Because of this, the value was set to zero for those 
MFIs with the number offices missing in the data and a missing dummy variable was 
generated to account for some of the selection bias within the sample.  
A fixed effects model, as opposed to a random or between effects model, is used 
in this case because the correlation between the unobserved effect and each explanatory 
variable was not sufficiently close zero (correlation between fixed effect and fitted value 
= -0.1002); in other words, the correlation of the fixed effect and the fitted value for each 
explanatory variable is statistically significant from zero; the standard error is 
approximately 0.0227. Fixed effects, as opposed to random effects, are used in this and 
the subsequent models because a random effects model would introduce bias into the 
estimation. This cross-sectional, time-series regression model allows for estimation 
across time, while controlling for each individual microfinance institution. 
Model One: Average Loan Balance = β0 + β1profitmargin + β2grossloanportfolio + 
β3riskcoverage + β4operationalselfsufficiency + β5years_operating + 
β6numberofactiveborrowers + β7offices + β8miss_office+ β9legaltype + β10region + 
β11scale + β12regulated + β13profit_status + β14target_market + αi +εit. 
 
Table 4.2.1: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects Model 
(Model One) 
Dependent Variable: 
Average Loan Balance 
(Obs: 10,934) 
(Groups: 1,971) 
Explanatory Variables:  
Profit Margin -0.2070 2.648  
Gross Loan Portfolio 0.2616 0.032 *** 
Risk Coverage -0.0036 0.0002  
Operational Self Sufficiency -6.0850 22.719  
Years in Operation 69.9535 14.027 *** 
Number of Active Borrowers -0.0015 0.0002 *** 
Offices 1.4545 0.387 *** 
Miss_Offices 183.6756 71.253 ** 
Age_Young -265.2852 128.054 ** 
Age_Mature -110.3619 87.046  
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Table 4.2.1: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects Model 
(Model One) (continued) 
Dependent Variable: 
Average Loan Balance 
(Obs: 10,934) 
(Groups: 1,971) 
Legal_Cooperative {omitted}   
Legal_NBFI {omitted}   
Legal_NGO {omitted}   
Legal_Rural Bank {omitted}   
Region_East Asia {omitted}   
Region_Eastern Europe {omitted}   
Region_LAC {omitted}   
Region_MENA {omitted}   
Region_South Asia {omitted}   
Scale_Medium -181.6653 92.262 ** 
Scale_Large -248.8888 123.174 ** 
Regulated_No {omitted}   
ProfitStatus_Profit {omitted}   
TargetMarket_Highend 1325.0250 140.069 *** 
TargetMarket_Lowend -200.3717 90.156 ** 
TargetMarket_Smallb 4077.8150 188.640 *** 
    
Rho 0.6964   
Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Omitted variables are included in and accounted for by the fixed effect 
 
The basic regression model above produces rather intuitive results as framed by 
the theory previously discussed regarding welfarist and institutionalist organizations. 
There is a positive and significant relationship between the gross loan portfolio and the 
average loan balance (ALB) disseminated; on average, as the organizations’ gross loan 
portfolio increases, so does the average loan balance disseminated by the organization. 
Similarly, as the institution increases in age, the ALB disseminated by that organization 
also increases. Specifically, there seems to be a decrease in ALB within young 
organizations compared to new organizations. In addition, as the number of borrowers 
increases, the ALB decreases.  
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Contrary to the theory discussed above regarding the number of branches which a 
MFI maintains, ALB is estimated to increase as the number of offices increases, all else 
equal. Compared to those MFIs reporting the number of offices, those who do not report 
this value have a positive and statistically significant relationship with ALB. As the scale 
of the organization increases, there seems to be a significant and negative relationship 
with ALB compared to small organizations, much like number of active borrowers. 
Target market presents interesting results; compared to the category “broad,” targeting 
high end and small business clients has a positive effect on ALB, while low end has a 
negative effect on ALB. The variance explained by the entire model was 0.6964, which 
can be considered significant but leaves room for improvement in terms of the variability 
of the explanatory variables within the model. 
4.2.b Models Two and Three 
One of the basic assumptions of the theoretical considerations supporting these 
analyses is that welfarist organizations will lend smaller amounts to a greater number of 
borrowers; conversely, institutionalist MFIs will lend larger amounts to fewer loan 
recipients. However, across the sample of MFIs in these data, the average loan balance is 
increasing, regardless of this mission or organizational classification, both on the 
intensive and extensive margin. As average loan balance is increasing over time, the 
degree to which it is increasing, shown as a percent change per unit, will add to the 
understanding of the interaction between this variable and the explanatory variables (as 
seen in Table 3.3.7 in the Summary Statistics section). The first difference of average 
loan balance (ALB) was calculated for each MFI that submitted information for multiple 
years in the sample (variable d_average); this was then categorized as decreasing, 
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increasing or remaining constant (variable d_sign) between groups of two across the 
years of submission. 
Table 4.2.2: Summary Statistics by Charter (Legal) Type for Rate of Change 
Variables  
 Charter (Legal) Type 
 Bank 
Cooperative/ 
Credit 
Union 
NBFI NGO Rural 
Bank 
Other 
d_average 
Obs: 
n: 
814 
154 
Obs: 
n: 
1,286 
343 
Obs: 
n: 
2,819 
558 
Obs: 
n: 
3,685 
704 
Obs: 
n: 
480 
121 
Obs: 
n: 
69 
23 
 201  231  -311  47  56  -58 
d_sign 
Obs: 
n: 
814 
154 
Obs: 
n: 
1,286 
343 
Obs: 
n: 
2,819 
558 
Obs: 
n: 
3,658 
704 
Obs: 
n: 
480 
121 
Obs: 
n: 
69 
23 
decreasing 
(-1) 
 238  378  894  1,142  121  25 
constant 
(0)  6  3  29  58  7  -- 
increasing 
(+1) 
 570  905  1,896  2,458  352  44 
 
Similar to the basic model, models two and three (outlined below) estimate the 
degree of interaction between the rate of change in the average loan balance of the 
organization against specific characteristics of the organizations that influence the 
intended outcomes of the institution, controlling for the same explanatory variables listed 
in the basic model. Again, a fixed effects model as opposed to a random or between 
effects model is used based upon the same assumptions as discussed in Model One, with 
the correlation between fixed effect and the fitted value being -0.2196 and -0.6416 in 
Models Two and Three, respectively.  
The first variation of the basic regression model will regress the percentage 
change per year or first difference of average loan balance against the explanatory 
variables used in Model One. The regression equation is as follows: 
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Model Two: % change (or first difference) of ALB = β0 + β1profitmargin + 
β2grossloanportfolio + β3riskcoverage + β4operationalselfsufficiency + β5years_operating 
+ β6numberofactiveborrowers + β7offices + β8miss_office+ β9legaltype + β10region + 
β11scale + β12regulated + β13profit_status + β14target_market +αi +εit. 
The second iteration of the basic regression model will regress the direction of 
change of the average loan balance (negative, positive, or no change) against the 
explanatory variables used in Model One, using the same fixed effects assumptions as 
discussed. The regression equation is as follows: 
Model Three: d_sign = β0 + β1profitmargin + β2grossloanportfolio + β3riskcoverage + 
β4operationalselfsufficiency + β5years_operating + β6numberofactiveborrowers + 
β7offices + β8miss_office+ β9legaltype + β10region + β11scale + β12regulated + 
β13profit_status + β14target_market + αi + εit. 
Table 4.2.3: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed Effects Models  
(Models Two and Three) 
Dependent Variable: 
Model Two: 
First Difference of ALB 
(Obs: 8,782) 
(Groups: 1,749) 
Model Three: 
Direction of Change in ALB 
(Obs: 8,782) 
(Groups: 1,749) 
Explanatory Variables:   
Profit Margin 0.1689 2.047  0.0011 0.0012  
Gross Loan Portfolio 0.0619 0.027 ** 0.000649 0.000163 *** 
Risk Coverage 
(scaled by 10,000) -1.2940 2.621 
 
-.0000945 0.000154  
Operational Self 
Sufficiency 
31.5566 29.698  0.04465 0.0175 ** 
Years in Operation -1.1569 11.162  -0.02224 0.00657 *** 
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
(scaled by 10,000) 
-2.8200 1.966 
 
-0.00371 0.00116 *** 
Offices 0.2779 0.308  0.000511 0.000181 ** 
Miss_Offices 91.6661 58.407  -0.1258 0.0344 *** 
Age_Young -159.6556 104.762  0.02841 0.0617  
Age_Mature -50.5367 68.907  0.8216 0.0406 ** 
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Table 4.2.3: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed Effects Models  
(Models Two and Three) (continued) 
Dependent Variable: 
Model Two: 
First Difference of ALB 
(Obs: 8,782) 
(Groups: 1,749) 
Model Three: 
Direction of Change in ALB 
(Obs: 8,782) 
(Groups: 1,749) 
       
Legal_Cooperative {omitted}   {omitted}   
Legal_NBFI {omitted}   {omitted}   
Legal_NGO {omitted}   {omitted}   
Legal_Rural Bank {omitted}   {omitted}   
Region_East Asia {omitted}   {omitted}   
Region_Eastern Europe {omitted}   {omitted}   
Region_LAC {omitted}   {omitted}   
Region_MENA {omitted}   {omitted}   
Region_South Asia {omitted}   {omitted}   
Scale_Medium -73.7082 71.966  -0.1997 0.0424 ** 
Scale_Large -105.2336 100.055  -0.2357 0.0589 *** 
Regulated_No {omitted}   {omitted}   
ProfitStatus_Profit {omitted}   {omitted}   
TargetMarket_Highend 689.5849 114.479 *** 0.3322 0.0674 *** 
TargetMarket_Lowend -127.5008 73.133 * -0.4092 0.0431 *** 
TargetMarket_Smallb 1,784.8640 188.587 *** 0.7888 0.915 *** 
       
Rho 0.5056   0.4520   
Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Omitted variables are included in and accounted for by the fixed effect  
 
As in the basic regression, the categorical variables legal status, region, regulated, 
and profit status were included in and accounted for by the fixed effect utilized in this 
regression. Between Models Two and Three, there seems to be significant differences in 
terms of the prediction of the overall model and the interaction between the direction of 
change and the classification of this change. The fraction of the variance between the 
explanatory variables explained by Model Two is greater than that of Model Three. 
However, there are a greater number of significant interactions between the dependent 
variable and explanatory variables in the third model in comparison to the second.  
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In terms of the overall rate of change in Model Two, only gross loan portfolio and 
the target market seem to have a significant interaction with the rate of change of average 
loan balance across the sample, which are quite intuitive. As the gross loan portfolio of 
an organization increases over time, the average loan balance also increases across the 
panel, all else equal. In addition, following a similar pattern of the results of Model One, 
compared to those MFIs targeting a broad lending base, those targeting a high end or 
small business generating base see a general increase over time in average loan balance; 
those targeting lower end borrowers have a correlating decrease in average loan balance, 
on average.  
The predictive power of Model Three is less than that of Model Two, but it yields 
significant results on a greater number of total explanatory variables. The third model can 
be considered a multivariate sign test and interpreted much like a probit regression, in 
terms of unit change interpretations, given the classification ranges between positive and 
negative one. Gross loan portfolio, operational self-sufficiency, and the number of offices 
which a microfinance institution maintains have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the direction of change of average loan balance; compared to new 
organizations, the average loan balance of mature organizations has a higher probability 
to increase over time. On average, compared to those organizations that target a broad 
client base, those that concentrate on lending to high end and small business based 
borrowers have positive interaction on the direction of change of average loan balance; in 
other words, MFIs targeting high end and small business based clients have a positive 
directional change in average loan balance across time. 
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Conversely, as the number of active borrowers increases, the average loan balance 
of the organization tends to decrease over time. In addition, as the number of years an 
institution has been operating increases, in contrast to the MIXMarket categorical 
variable age, the average loan balance of the organization is predicted to decrease, all else 
equal. Organizations targeting low end borrowers compared to those that target a broad 
base have a negative relationship with direction of change of the average loan balance in 
this sample, on average. In addition, compared to those organizations serving less than 
two million borrowers (classified as small scale), the probability that ALB increases over 
time in medium and large scale MFIs results in a negative relationship. 
From the initial fixed effects models performed and discussed in this section, it 
seems that there is not a significant difference for the average loan balance between the 
different charter types in this sample, and one can conclude, holding all else equal, that 
average loan balance is in fact not being influenced by the legal status of an organization. 
However, the gross loan portfolio and the target market of the organization have a 
significant impact on average loan balance and the rate at which it changes over time in 
the sample used, as is seen across all three models. These results indicate that average 
loan balance is changing across time, predominantly in a positive direction, while a 
smaller component of MFIs are decreasing this value or not changing it over time. This 
supports the secondary hypothesis that the entire sub-sector of microfinance is drifting 
toward an institutionalist philosophy of microlending, as those MFIs that are increasing 
their average loan balance across time are doing so at a greater rate than those choosing 
not to change this value. In addition, newer MFIs entering the microcredit market are 
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doing as a legal status that falls under the umbrella of the institutionalist philosophy of 
lending, with NBFIs and Banks comprising a greater number of new MFIs in these data. 
4.2.c Model Four 
Institutional environment may also be playing a key role in influencing the 
outcomes of MFIs that may not be accounted for in Models One through Three. As the 
discussion of theoretical considerations outlines, institutional and macroeconomic factors, 
such as the flow of capital and level of political stability within a country, can influence 
the absorptive capacity of communities within a nation, in that the structural 
characteristics governing a community or region, whether formal or informal, can 
increase or decrease the flow of resources to specific demographics.  
With this in mind, the fourth regression analysis (below) will attempt to 
demonstrate the degree of interaction between microfinance institutions, controlling for 
type of MFI, and the institutional environment in which they operate. In this vein of 
reasoning, the broad research question for the following analyses is: in what capacity 
does the institutional environment, in conjunction with the level of development of each 
country, influence the average loan balance of microfinance institutions? For this model, 
the following hypothesis will be tested: those MFIs that operate in a more democratic 
environment and have greater access to capital (also assuming this environment affords 
the opportunity for more liberalized monetary policies) will have larger average loan 
balances than those MFIs operating in autocratic conditions. The institutional 
environment will be measured in this section by country characteristics that are 
considered relevant measures of the overall development of a country. Specifically, these 
include variables from the World Bank and polity scores. 
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For the final regression analysis of this piece, the following model will be 
employed, adapting village level fixed effects outline used by McIntosh, de Janevry, and 
Sadoulet (2005) to the legal type of microfinance institutions, while controlling for 
country characteristics that are accepted as baseline indicators of development, in terms 
of government, financial systems and structures, and societal indicators. 
Model Four: Ojt = αt + fj +βAjt + θA2jt + βlegalClegaljt + ClegaljtZjϒlegal + εjt 
Where: 
j: Microfinance Institution 
t: year 
z: country characteristics6 
GDP per capita 
Infant Mortality of children under 5 (per 1,000 births) 
Polity: Institutionalized Democracy 
Polity: Regulation of Participation and Expression of Political Preferences 
Polity: Competitiveness of Participation (degree of civil interaction) 
Real Interest Rate (%)  
Net Domestic Credit  
Broad money (% of GDP)  
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)  
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)  
Legal: 
Bank 
Credit Union/Cooperative 
Non Bank Financial Institution 
Non Government Organization 
Rural Banks 
Other 
 
  
                                                          
6 Definitions and Summary Statistics by Region for the country characteristics included in these models are included in 
Appendix D and E, respectively. 
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Table 4.2.4 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors in Fixed-Effects 
Model with Country Variables (Model Four) 
Dependent Variable: 
Average Loan Balance 
(Obs: 8,657) 
(Groups: 1,580) 
Explanatory Variables:  
Profit Margin 0.1240 1.841  
Gross Loan Portfolio 0.2289 0.023 *** 
Risk Coverage -0.0002209 0.00196  
Operational Self Sufficiency -32.1878 26.158  
Years in Operation -7.5723 15.215  
Number of Active Borrowers -0.001362 0.000186 *** 
Offices 1.3720 0.280 *** 
Miss_Offices 76.8296 56.619  
Age_Young -30.9564 103.001  
Age_Mature 6.7874 68.971  
Legal_Cooperative {omitted}   
Legal_NBFI {omitted}   
Legal_NGO {omitted}   
Legal_Rural Bank {omitted}   
Region_East Asia {omitted}   
Region_Eastern Europe {omitted}   
Region_LAC {omitted}   
Region_MENA {omitted}   
Region_South Asia {omitted}   
Scale_Medium -57.1965 72.024  
Scale_Large -53.0634 96.750  
Regulated_No {omitted}   
ProfitStatus_Profit {omitted}   
TargetMarket_Highend 1,507.1950 123.960 *** 
TargetMarket_Lowend -354.0771 73.590 *** 
TargetMarket_Smallb 4,369.8300 167.693 *** 
    
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 0.5451 0.035 *** 
Mortality rate, children under-5 (per 1,000 live 
births)  
6.8779 3.949 * 
Polity: Institutionalized Democracy 12.6126 26.966  
Polity: Regulation of Participation and Expression 
of Political Preferences 
62.2054 53.066  
Polity: Competitiveness of Participation (degree of 
civil interaction) 
-76.1655 71.703  
Real Interest Rate (%)  -2.9547 2.712  
Net Domestic Credit (scaled by 1,000,000,000) -4,040 1,140 ** 
Broad money (% of GDP)  7.5572 4.502 * 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP)  
8.1476 2.881 ** 
Rho 0.8195   
Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Omitted variables are included in and accounted for by the fixed effect 
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The predictive power of Model Four (0.8195) is greater than that of the previous 
three models. This indicates that this particular model allows for an increased 
understanding of the variance within the explanatory variables in relationship to the 
average loan balance of MFIs than in the previous models. As this model controls for 
country level factors which may be influencing the movement of average loan balance, in 
either a positive or negative direction, this model particularly informs the discussion 
surrounding mission drift and potential institutional level influences on this phenomenon.  
Those continuous variables with a significant interaction to average loan balance 
in Model One remain as such in terms of significance and directionality, with the 
exception of years of operation. Gross Loan Portfolio, Number of Active Borrowers, and 
Offices continue to have a significant relationship to average loan balance, including 
nearly identical coefficients and degree of significance as in Model One. As in the 
previous three models, as the gross loan portfolio of the organization increases, the 
average loan balance the microfinance institution increases. Falling in line with the 
previous discussions, as the average loan balance of the institution is estimated to 
decrease as the number of active borrowers within the organization increases. Finally, 
there is a positive correlation between the number of offices an organization maintains 
over time and the average loan balance distributed to its active clients.  
It is assumed in the theoretical discussion that welfarist organizations will have a 
greater number of offices because they are also serving a greater number of borrowers at 
a particular time. However, this does not seem to be the case in this analysis. Instead, 
regardless of institutional type, as the number of offices increases across time, all else 
equal, the average loan balance of that organization also increases. 
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The target market of the organization, when compared to MFIs that direct their 
services to a broad market, follows the same pattern of estimation found in Model One, 
including the directionality and value of the resulting coefficients. High End and Small 
Business targeting MFIs have a positive relationship to ALB, compared to those 
classified as targeting a broad spectrum, all else equal; on average, those MFIs classified 
as Low End have a negative and significant relationship with ALB over time. In terms of 
other categorical variables of previous significance, the interaction of age and scale to 
ALB is no longer recorded as such, compared to Model One. 
Several macro-level variables included in Model Four seem to have a relationship 
or interaction with average loan balance in this iteration. GDP per capita, mortality rate, 
children under-5 (per 1,000 live births), broad money (% of GDP), and domestic credit 
provided by banking sector (% of GDP) have a significant and positive relationship to 
ALB, all else equal. On average, an increase in GDP per capita across the panel is 
associated with an increase in average loan balance for MFIs in the sample, all else equal. 
Average loan balance is estimated to increase as the mortality rate (children under-5 (per 
1,000 live births)) within the country increases, holding all covariates constant. Average 
loan balance is estimated to increase for each percent increase in broad money, as a 
percentage of GDP, holding all other explanatory variables constant. Domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector (% of GDP), has a similar relationship to ALB, on 
average. Average loan balance is estimated to decrease for each one-percent increase in 
Net Domestic Credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP), all else equal. 
Broad money as a percentage of GDP and domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP) both influence the flow of capital in the formal market, which was 
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discussed in the theoretical section of the review of literature. It would seem that as the 
average loan balances distributed by MFIs increase over time, so do these measures of 
capital flows in the formal market. The results of the interaction of these variables with 
ALB support the idea that increased levels of capital in the formal market positively 
influence the flows of capital to semi- or informal banking organizations, such as MFIs.  
Given that the mortality rate of developed countries is less than that of developing 
countries, the interaction between this variable and ALB is complex. As mortality rate 
increases across time, ALB also increases, for the countries included in the analysis. This 
would be the opposite direction or effect of mortality rate than would be optimally 
desired overall. Reverse causality may be present within the interaction between average 
loan balance and infant mortality in that institutions are lending to specific demographics 
because of issues affecting these households such as child mortality. 
This may also simply be explained by the fact that countries that have reduced 
levels of infant mortality are not included in this study, thereby inflating the level of this 
rate in the analysis. Those countries presently included in the analysis are also considered 
developing or transitioning nations, which have a much higher rate of child mortality 
compared to developed nations but, on the whole, has been in decline globally. 
Specifically, this figure may be skewed in a negative direction due to the influence of 
regions included that have a much higher infant mortality rate. Table 4.2.5 shows that this 
average is influenced heavily by those countries within the Sub-Saharan region. 
Specifically, Sierra Leone (204), Mali (192), Chad (178), Democratic Republic of Congo 
(177), Angola (171), and Guinea-Bissau (171) have the highest infant mortality rate 
among children under five within this region.   
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Table 4.2.5: Average Infant Mortality Rate by Regional Classification 
Region Infant Mortality Rate  
(under 5, per 1,000 births) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(36 Countries) 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min:  
Max:  
587 
117.62 
35.92 
41.5 
230 
East Asia and the Pacific 
(13 Countries) 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.:  
Min:  
Max:  
404 
29.66 
20.63 
5.3 
94.7 
Latin America and The Caribbean 
(25 Countries) 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.:  
Min:  
Max:  
502 
28.64 
16.31 
8.7 
160.7 
Middle East and North Africa 
(10 Countries) 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.:  
Min:  
Max:  
63 
36.73 
19.71 
9.3 
95.1 
South Asia 
(7 Countries) 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.:  
Min:  
Max:  
373 
66.98 
20.07 
12.2 
129.2 
 
Overall, Model Four reframes the basic fixed-effects regression used in Model 
One, taking into account the institutional environment of the microfinance institutions 
using country level variables. This model attempts to measure the influence of spillover 
effects from the formal market into the microfinance industry. It seems that in this sample 
as the level of development increases within a country so does the average loan balance 
of microfinance institutions operating within that same nation. This broadly validates the 
assumption that the institutional environment influences the outcomes of microfinance 
institutions, in terms of fulfilling the mission of the organization. 
 
95 
4.3 Implications and Basic Conclusions of Analyses 
The preceding regression analyses inform the understanding surrounding 
characteristics of microfinance institutions that influence how average loan balance 
changes over time and what this means in terms of mission drift for microfinance 
institutions, on the individual level and as an industry. As microfinance institutions grow 
over time in this sample, as measured by the number of active borrowers and gross loan 
portfolio, they seem to shift more towards an institutionalist philosophy of lending, 
validating the premise that such organizations tend to lend larger amounts to fewer 
borrowers. As the legal or charter status does not change in this sample and is accounted 
for in the fixed effect of the regression analyses, one cannot specifically infer the degree 
of this broad shift in mission within a particular category of institution, as specified by 
the MIXMarket classifications. However, specific characteristics and measures of these 
broad classifications found in the literature (welfarist and institutionalist) surrounding 
microfinance indicate that the majority of institutions are lending more money to fewer 
clients across time.  
Model One provides a baseline discussion of the interaction between average loan 
balance an organizational characteristics that influence the outcome of microfinance 
institutions; in addition to the basic explanatory variables, several categorical variables 
were included to better inform the discussion. As seen in Table 4.3.6, Gross Loan 
Portfolio, Years in Operation, the Number of Active Borrowers, Offices and Offices 
missing have a significant interaction with average loan balance, all else equal.  
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Table 4.3.6: Synopsis of Significant Interactions in Regressions (Models One 
through Four) 
Model 
Significant Explanatory Variables 
(Continuous) 
One: Basic Model 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Years in Operation 
Number of Active Borrowers  
Offices 
Offices Missing 
Two: First Difference Gross Loan Portfolio 
Three: Direction of Change 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 
Years in Operation 
Number of Active Borrowers 
Offices 
Offices Missing 
Four: Institutional Environment 
Gross Loan Portfolio  
Number of Active Borrowers 
Offices 
 
Transforming the dependent variable by taking the first difference results in a significant 
interaction with only gross loan portfolio, in the second model. However, the variance 
explained by this regression was predominantly controlled by the large values related to 
gross loan portfolio. In Model Three, the direction of this change yielded significant 
results for the same variables as Model One, while also influencing the operational self-
sufficiency of the organization. This regression also allows for greater explanation of 
mission drift within the organizations in this sample.  
From the results in Model Four, we can conclude that there is a positive 
correlation between the level of economic development of a country and the average loan 
balance of the microfinance institutions in these data; as the basic measures of economic 
growth used in this model increase, the average loan balance of microfinance institutions 
operating within this environment also increase. With the exception of infant mortality 
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rate, as development increases, including the absorptive capacity of the institutional 
environment and social capital, so does the average loan balance of microfinance 
institutions. This supports the assumption that as the microfinance industry evolves 
within an ever changing institutional environment, this metamorphosis is leaning more 
towards an institutionalist philosophy of lending. The degree or level of liberalization 
within an economy, measured by the polity data, did not yield significant results. 
Given that an increase in average loan balance, controlling for institutional factors 
influencing the outcomes of the organization, indicates alignment with the institutionalist 
philosophy of lending, one can conclude from these regression models that average loan 
balance is increasing across the sample; as it does, there is a positive relationship between 
the overall loan portfolio of the organization and the number of offices it maintains. As 
the average loan balance of an organization increases, the number of active borrowers it 
serves decreases.  
These results support the basic hypothesis that microfinance, as an industry, is 
drifting toward an institutionalist philosophy of lending. As discussed in the introduction, 
these data are heavily influenced by the organizational capacity of the MFI remitting 
information to MIXMarket. One can assume that these organizations have the 
administrative resources to assemble the necessary information to create a profile with 
MIXMarket. This omits a large subset of small MFIs that may not have sufficient staff or 
capacity to collect the necessary data to create a profile with MIXMarket. This can also 
potentially explain why those countries with a more developed institutional environment 
have higher average loan balances. These same MFIs with the administrative capabilities 
to remit information to MIXMarket, may also be operating in an institutional 
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environment that could be considered more developed than those organizations that are 
not, or cannot, submit information to this clearinghouse.  
Given these assumptions, this sample may be skewed towards an institutionalist 
perspective upon submission of the data, assuming that welfarist organization may have 
decreased levels of organizational and administrative capacity. This difference may also 
be explained in that those welfarist organizations submitting information are subsidized 
by grants or other sources of funding in some way so that they can maintain a specific 
level of services to their borrowers. In addition, MFIs serving the core poor may be 
underrepresented in this sample, as these institutions may be considered welfarist and, as 
previously discussed may not have the administrative support necessary to remit 
information to MIXMarket. Regardless, one must keep in mind that this sample of MFIs 
may not provide a true representation of the breadth of services offered by microfinance 
institutions across the globe, including those that choose to concentrate on offering 
services such as savings or insurance.  
In terms of documenting mission drift in this sample, the results of the preceding 
models indicate that a positive shift in average loan balance exists on both the intensive 
and extensive margins for the MFIs in this sample, showing that these organizations are 
drifting towards the institutionalist philosophy of lending on multiple levels. In terms of 
the intensive margin of change, as age or years of operation increase so does average loan 
balance; similarly, as MFIs grow in terms of scale, average loan balance also increases. 
This indicates a shift in the services provided or the intended outcome of MFIs; an 
organization can classify operations as large while still disseminating smaller loans to the 
chosen target market. Conversely, a small organization may distribute larger loans, given 
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that this reflects their mission. Regardless of scale, the outcome of the organizations 
included in this analysis is shifting toward an institutionalist philosophy of lending, as 
measured by average loan balance. On the extensive margin, newer MFIs, as represented 
in these data, are providing microcredit services under the provision of an institutionalist 
mission more often than the welfarist perspective. This can be framed in either a positive 
or negative perspective, but regardless of the voice chosen, a shift is occurring within 
these institutions in terms of the services offered and the demographic of households 
receiving these services. The next chapter will provide a summary of the dissertation, 
present policy implications, and provide a discussion of the limitations of the present 
research and plans for future research on the topics included in this piece. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Future Research 
5.1 Dissertation Summary 
The mission of microfinance institutions and the manner in which the adopted 
mission of each institution impacts the broad outcome of the organization sparks an 
intense debate as to the service these institutions provide to the targeted demographic of 
households. As discussed in the previous sections, a schism exists between two opposing 
viewpoints which attempt to explain the link between intention and outcome by way of 
organizational mission. From the welfarist perspective, the mission of the organization 
directs resources to the poorest households in a community and the services provided are 
tailored to meet the needs of these households. Institutionalist organizations seek to 
provide such services to impoverished households in a sustainable manner; this impacts 
the target demographic of the organization and creating a viable financial institution 
becomes the primary focus of the organization. 
Using average loan balance and the corresponding legal status of the organization 
as the gauge of a microfinance institution’s mission, the preceding regression analyses 
attempted to address the following research question: given that a positive, overall shift in 
average loan balance indicates an institutionalist shift in mission, how does this impact 
microfinance institutions and the demographics they target on the intensive and extensive 
margins? There is no difference across the types of MFIs in this sample in terms of 
average loan balance; the dependent variable is increasing across the majority of the 
sample on both the intensive and extensive margins. More specifically, approximately 
68% of the time this variable is moving in a positive direction across time. However, 
particular factors seem to influence the direction of this change, including gross loan 
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portfolio, number of active borrowers, age of the organization, scale of operations, and 
the target market for the organization. These variables are of interest because they reflect 
the mission of the organization in terms of the welfarist versus institutionalist philosophy 
of lending.  
On average, in this sample, microfinance institutions are disseminating larger 
loans to recipients, regardless of institutional or legal type, be that welfarist or 
institutionalist. Instead of following the life-cycle of MFIs as discussed in the theoretical 
consideration sections, which involves entering the market as welfarist institution and 
evolving toward the institutionalist philosophy of lending, newer organizations are 
adhering to an institutionalist philosophy of lending from the date that they are 
established. This demonstrates a twofold shift in the dissemination of microcredit, both 
within organizations and in the organizational environment. As seen through all four 
regression models, average loan balance is increasing and the target market served is 
drifting toward the high end and small business loans, as opposed to a broad client base, 
which falls in line with the institutionalist philosophy of lending.  
This shift in target demographic, from serving the “poorest of the poor” to those 
living just below the poverty line, moves beyond the general rift in organizational 
philosophy. Microfinance organization now target and assist the entrepreneurial poor at a 
greater rate than the core poor, as it is assumed that the entrepreneurial poor hold less risk 
and have higher rates of repayment. It seems that microfinance institutions have become 
more concerned with patterning their services after those of the formal financial market, 
in terms of risk, repayment and organizational sustainability through services offered, 
than extending financial services to an underserved demographic such as the core poor. 
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This movement may be a result of pressure from board members or managerial staff to 
create a self-sustaining financial institution; this pressure increases the likelihood that an 
organization chooses to adhere to the institutionalist philosophy of lending as it provides 
a higher rate of return to the lending entity, as discussed in the theoretical considerations 
section.  
As a development tool, the overall impact in reducing the level of poverty of 
clients through access to microcredit comes into question, as the poorest households are 
no longer served by MFIs who adopt an institutionalist mission. Although this critique 
may seem negative since MFIs are still assisting households in general, it is necessary to 
address such a shift as extremely impoverished households remain unable to meet basic 
needs. Microfinance was also considered a panacea of sorts for the “poorest of the poor” 
but seems to be of greater assistance to those individuals and households just below the 
poverty line. This shift, ultimately a reflection of the schism of microfinance, leaves room 
for a new level of evolution for these organizations, should donors and managers choose 
to refocus on the core poor. 
Secondarily, when the poorest households are served by MFIs, as in welfarist 
organizations, they are not necessarily using the capital borrowed towards the creation of 
a profit-generating small business, thus, making repayment difficult if it is used for 
purely consumption smoothing purposes. This use of loans also undermines the intended 
outcome of these organizations, as they seek to not only assist the core poor but wish to 
do so by generating small business opportunities in local communities so as to create 
sustainable sources of income for these households creating positive spillover effects for 
these organizations. The risk associated with core poor households seems to be 
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outweighing the philanthropic intent of these organizations and microfinance institutions 
are lending to the entrepreneurial poor at a greater rate as a result. 
The shift in mission toward the institutionalist philosophy seems logical in 
generating a sustainable model of for development based financial institution; however, 
given that this ideology also theoretically crowds out lending to the core poor, mission 
drift has negative effects in providing financial services to extremely impoverished 
households. While the addition of institutionalist microfinance organizations to the semi-
formal banking market adds opportunity to access financial services, it still 
predominantly excludes the poorest households. Perhaps this shift lends itself to a new 
level in the evolution of microfinance, where welfarist organizations will concentrate on 
consumption-smoothing based services, still targeted services to the core poor in order to 
mitigate budgetary shocks through savings and insurance opportunities like health 
savings accounts instead of primarily offering microloans.  
Microfinance as an industry is changing. As discussed at length per the review of 
theoretical arguments and regression analyses, organizations are moving toward an 
institutionalist philosophy of lending, as measured by the average amount disseminated 
by the organizations in the sample used. This shift is occurring not only in existing MFIs 
but also in new MFIs entering the market. The change in ideology calls into question the 
impact of offering microcredit to poor households, as it can be argued that this service no 
longer assists the poorest of the poor as was originally intended. 
5.2 Policy Implications 
The policy environment in terms of regulation (or lack thereof) has a direct 
impact on the efficiency of microfinance institutions in terms of scale benefits and size, 
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which are linked to the cost functions for MFIs. As discussed in the theoretical 
considerations section and examined through Model Four, a liberalized policy framework 
can introduce the necessary regulations for the financial markets of developing countries 
to enter into international exchange while simultaneously reducing the breadth of services 
offered by commercial banks to the “risk-less” populace. This excludes a vast portion of 
potential loan recipients due to the perceived risk held by impoverished households that 
hold reduced levels of or no collateral.  
The challenge for policymakers in terms of supporting programs such as 
microfinance is to ensure that the policies providing monetary or infrastructure support to 
these organizations are targeting aid toward the intended policy outcomes. As 
microfinance is seen as a means to combat poverty, the target of these aid dollars falls 
into two distinct camps: increasing income or reducing poverty, which in some cases are 
mutually exclusive (Wright, 2000). Microfinance works within the context of this 
framework when services offered by the lending institution decrease the overall 
budgetary fluctuations of loan-receiving households (Wright, 2000; Hulme and Mosley, 
1997; Sharma and Buchenreider, 2002).  
The long-term impact of microfinance hinges on the overall sustainability of the 
services provided to clients and the sustainability of the institution itself. Ultimately, 
microcredit and microbanking services should increase the overall potential of the 
households receiving this assistance, in order to use the capital in creating lasting sources 
of income. Effectively including the poor in financial markets benefits the entire 
economic system of a developing nation by increasing these households’ ability to 
manage shocks and crises which cannot otherwise be provided for at the federal level due 
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to a general scarcity of public funds allocated to social welfare programs (Zeller, 2001; 
IFAD, 2003; Christen, Lauer, Lyman and Rosenberg, 2011). As such, microfinance can 
be used as a tool by the policy makers within a developing nation to assist households 
living below the poverty line in creating new and sustainable sources of income. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
A main limitation of the regression analyses in this piece is the sample used, as 
discussed at length in Section 3.2. A richer analysis of microfinance institutions could be 
performed should a greater degree of information regarding welfarist organizations 
become available. Also, obtaining and using the average interest rate of these 
organizations across time, regardless of charter type or legal classification, would greatly 
inform the discussion based upon the theoretical considerations and discussion 
surrounding the impact of maintaining an optimal interest rate on organizational self-
sufficiency. Finally, endogeneity is an issue in this study, again, linked to the sample used 
for the analysis. As the data remitted to MIXMarket are self-reported by the MFIs 
included in the sample, information entry errors may be present due to operator error or 
incorrect information may intentionally have been submitted to the clearinghouse.  
In terms of future research, the relationship between the average loan balance and 
interest rate of the organization is vital in the discussion of mission drift within 
microfinance institutions; future studies on these topics will include interest rate as an 
explanatory variable if at all possible. Also, directly linking the concepts an organization 
discusses in terms of the words used in the mission statement to the average loan balance 
of the organization, classification of the organization itself (welfarist v. institutionalist 
charter type), and other explanatory variables reflecting the health of the organization, 
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would provide a richer discussion as to how the mission of microfinance organizations 
influences, or does not impact, the intended outcome of the organization. 
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Appendix A: Complete list of MFIs with altered date established 
The following is a comprehensive list of the microfinance institutions that submitted a 
date established (“date_est”) which is after the years of data (year) submitted to 
MIXMarket (117 observations in the data). This variable was used to calculate the 
approximate age of the MFIs in the dataset (“years_operating”) and is shown below prior 
to the adjustments made as described in the text. 
MFI Name Year date_est 
ACLEDA Lao 2007 1/1/2008 
ACRG 2005 4/1/2006 
AgroCredit 2007-2008 9/1/2009 
ALIDÃ© 2003-2005 1/14/2006 
Almaz 2008 9/27/2009 
AREGAK UCO 2005 5/1/2006 
Ascend Nigeria 2004-2006 1/27/2007 
Asirvad 2006 8/29/2007 
Azeri Star 2002 5/1/2003 
BancamÃa 2007 1/1/2008 
BJS 2005 1/1/2006 
BPR NBP 2 2005 1/1/2006 
BRAC - LBR 2008 1/22/2009 
BRAC - UGA 2004-2005 1/1/2006 
Buksh Foundation 2008 1/1/2009 
CARD AgroCredit 2006-2007 7/1/2008 
CF Lanka 2004-2006 9/3/2007 
Chaitanya 2008 3/31/2009 
CLECAM Wisigara 2007 1/1/2008 
COAC Padre Vicente 2007 12/5/2008 
Contigo Microfinanzas 2009 4/30/2010 
Cordial Microfinanzas 2006 3/1/2007 
CRAC Nuestra Gente 2007 1/1/2008 
Dastras 2008 7/27/2009 
Ehyoi kuhiston 2006 2/6/2007 
EREL Bank 2009-2011 1/1/2012 
Express Finance 2003-2006 7/24/2007 
Farm Credit Armenia 2006 9/18/2007 
Farz Foundation 2008 9/9/2009 
FIDES Bank Namibia 2009 1/2/2010 
FM Bank 2009 2/23/2010 
GAMIFI SA 2007 2/1/2009 
Garant-Invest 2006 9/25/2007 
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MFI Name Year date_est 
GTFS 2008 7/17/2009 
HELP 2009-2010 7/19/2011 
Hilola Invest 2007 4/15/2008 
IIFC Group 2009 1/6/2010 
Imdodi Rushd 2008 3/10/2009 
ImerCredit 2002-2006 12/3/2007 
IMHOKHAI FARMERS INITIATIVE 2010 10/31/2011 
Imodi Hutal 2006 7/1/2007 
Inam 2008 4/1/2009 
Izdiharona Microfinance 2007 6/1/2008 
Izzat Ravshan 2009-2010 8/15/2011 
Juhudi Kilimo 2008 4/1/2009 
Kashf Bank 2007 6/1/2008 
KEEF 2003 1/1/2004 
KixiCredito 2005 1/1/2006 
ltayskiy Fond Mikrozaymov 2010-2011 7/11/2012 
MCO Orlan 2003 1/1/2004 
Microfin Plus 2008-2010 7/19/2011 
Microfinance Kyrgyzstan 2009-2011 4/16/2012 
MIKROFIN 1997-1998 1/1/1999 
MLO 'Saodat Invest' 2005-2007 5/2/2008 
NRSP Bank 2010 3/1/2011 
Opportunity Tanzania 2004-2006 12/1/2007 
OXUS - AFG 2005-2006 1/1/2007 
Podemos Progresar 2009 2/5/2010 
Regional Development Bank 2008-2009 3/1/2010 
Sahayata 2005 1/1/2006 
Saija 2008 1/1/2009 
Samrudhi MicroFin 2006 1/1/2007 
SOFIPE SARL 2009 1/1/2010 
Sonata 2005 1/1/2006 
SPBD Fiji 2009 10/18/2010 
STU 2010 9/6/2011 
Sugd Microfin 2006 1/1/2007 
SVSDF 2007 4/2/2008 
TDMN 2007 11/30/2008 
UFSPL 2008 1/2/2009 
Utkarsh 2008 8/5/2009 
VFS 2002-2005 1/23/2006 
WHO 2003-2005 1/1/2006 
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MFI Name Year date_est 
WMN (Russia) 1999-2001 6/30/2005 
WODASS 2008-2010 10/8/2011 
Yengil Kredit 2008 1/23/2009 
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Appendix B: MFIs without date established 
The following organizations did not remit a date established as a section of their profile 
information. The date established was assigned as January 1 of the first year in which the 
organization submitted data to MIXMarket. This was done for 130 organizations (429 
observations) and a complete list is below. 
MFI Name Years Established Country 
AFS 2003-2010 1-Jan-03 Afghanistan 
Arthacharya 2002-2010 1-Jan-02 Sri Lanka 
WWI - AFG 2004-2010 1-Jan-04 Afghanistan 
MoFAD 2005-2010 1-Jan-05 Afghanistan 
NRDSC 2003-2011 1-Jan-03 Nepal 
AMFI 2004-2010 1-Jan-04 Afghanistan 
AREGAK 1999-2006 2009-2010 1-Jan-99 Armenia 
CSI 1998-2001 1-Jan-98 Belarus 
Parwaz 2003-2010 1-Jan-03 Afghanistan 
SINERGIJA 2003-2011 1-Jan-03 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CMEDFI 2002-2011 1-Jan-02 Philippines 
AKRSP 1997-2001 1-Jan-97 Pakistan 
FUNDENUSE 2003-2011 1-Jan-03 Nicaragua 
ARMP 2003-2009 1-Jan-03 Afghanistan 
EDPYME Proempresa 1997-2011 1-Jan-97 Peru 
ZECLOF 2000-2003 1-Jan-00 Zimbabwe 
ASDEB 1999-2001 1-Jan-99 Togo 
MUFFA 2001-2003 1-Jan-01 Cameroon 
FDEA 2011 1-Jan-11 Senegal 
CFA 2005-2011 1-Jan-05 Afghanistan 
UBPR- Union des Banques Populaires du 
Rwanda 2004-2005 1-Jan-04 Rwanda 
PACT - Myanmar 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Myanmar (Burma) 
Tadhamon 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Yemen 
MICREDITO 2006-2011 1-Jan-06 El Salvador 
NBJK 2011 1-Jan-11 India 
MUFEDE 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Burkina Faso 
MADRAC 2005-2010 1-Jan-05 Afghanistan 
WOCCU - AFG 2005-2010 1-Jan-05 Afghanistan 
Sunduq 2005-2009 1-Jan-05 Afghanistan 
Credex 2010 1-Jan-10 Mexico 
RB Capalonga 2006 1-Jan-06 Philippines 
BPR BCS 2006 1-Jan-06 Indonesia 
BPR WRD 2006 1-Jan-06 Indonesia 
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MFI Name Years Established Country 
BPR AMJ 2006 1-Jan-06 Indonesia 
BPR ANug 2006 1-Jan-06 Indonesia 
BJS 2011 1-Jan-11 India 
NCS 2011 1-Jan-11 India 
SU 2010 1-Jan-10 India 
CCSF 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Cambodia 
East Mamprusi Comm Bank 2009-2010 1-Jan-09 Ghana 
CPC-ADIM 2006-2007 1-Jan-06 Guinea-Bissau 
REMEC NIAYES 2011 1-Jan-11 Senegal 
ACFIME-CREDO 2010 1-Jan-10 Burkina Faso 
MECAP 2011 1-Jan-11 Senegal 
UMECAS 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Senegal 
URMECS 2011 1-Jan-11 Senegal 
CHWDA 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 China, People's Republic of 
PCWDA 2008-2011 1-Jan-08 China, People's Republic of 
YYWDA 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 China, People's Republic of 
JXWDA 2007-2008 2010-2011 1-Jan-07 
China, People's Republic 
of 
XXWDA 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 China, People's Republic of 
RB Malabang 2011 1-Jan-11 Philippines 
RB San Jacinto 2006-2008 1-Jan-06 Philippines 
Tianjin 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Degaf 2008-2009 1-Jan-08 Ethiopia 
Adok Timo 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Kenya 
CEFOR 2011 1-Jan-11 Madagascar 
Finance Invest NBCO 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Azerbaijan 
Nanzhao FPC 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Sahara Utsarga 2011 1-Jan-11 India 
Harmos 2008-2009 1-Jan-08 Zambia 
Pundutso 2008-2009 1-Jan-08 Zimbabwe 
PEBCO 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Benin 
Ezi Savings and Loan 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Ghana 
COOPEC KOZIBI 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 Rwanda 
COOPEC UBAKA 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 Rwanda 
UCEA 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 Rwanda 
Amalkom 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Iraq 
BMT Sanama 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Indonesia 
ASA-AFG 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Afghanistan 
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Nesie-meken 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Kazakhstan 
FESPROD 2008-2011 1-Jan-08 Benin 
Fusion Microfinance 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 India 
Guangxi Longlin 2008-2011 1-Jan-08 China, People's Republic of 
Puyang RCC 2008-2011 1-Jan-08 China, People's Republic of 
AMANSIE WEST RB 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Ghana 
ANKOBRA WEST RB 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Ghana 
ASOKORE RB 2010 1-Jan-10 Ghana 
Pacific S&amp;L 2011 1-Jan-11 Ghana 
CDOT 2008-2011 1-Jan-08 India 
INNOVATIVE FINANCE 2009 1-Jan-09 Ghana 
ACCESS 2008-2011 1-Jan-08 Jamaica 
BFI 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 China, People's Republic of 
Gansu Wushan URDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
MCPO Kai 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
JSSDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
LPAC 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Qinghai UNDP 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
YESC 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 China, People's Republic of 
Shanxi Jinzhong RPAA 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 China, People's Republic of 
YJRCDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
YMCREDA 2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
URDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Gansu Jishishan RDA 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 China, People's Republic of 
Guide RDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Guanling RDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Guizhou Xingren RDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Guizhou Ziyun RDA 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Yucheng FPC 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Guinan LPAC 2011 1-Jan-11 China, People's Republic of 
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MFI Name Years Established Country 
Yi FPC 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 China, People's Republic of 
Laishui FPC 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 China, People's Republic of 
URSA 2011 1-Jan-11 Comoros 
USM 2011 1-Jan-11 Comoros 
Progresso 2011 1-Jan-11 Mozambique 
HanHua 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
JinjiLake 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Jinzhong 2011 1-Jan-11 China, People's Republic of 
Maanshan 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
MLC Jiangnan 2011 1-Jan-11 China, People's Republic of 
WHMLC 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
HARBEMCO 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Philippines 
CMF Umurimo 2007-2011 1-Jan-07 Rwanda 
SCDS 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 India 
MEC FADEC 2011 1-Jan-11 Senegal 
MEC PROPAS 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Senegal 
Intellcash 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 India 
Remu 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Kenya 
GMSSS 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 India 
Paypal Thrift and Loans 2008-2010 1-Jan-08 Nigeria 
SSD 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 India 
SDF 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 India 
Multivest MFB 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Nigeria 
Olubasiri MFB 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Nigeria 
GODO 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 Suriname 
COECEPT 2010-2011 1-Jan-10 Togo 
RB Sugbuanon 2011 1-Jan-11 Philippines 
Keshiketeng RCU 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 China, People's Republic of 
Perviy Primorskiy 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Russia 
ARGENTIFERE 2009-2011 1-Jan-09 Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 
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Appendix C: Explanatory Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Average Loan 
Balance ($US): 
Total value of outstanding loans divided by the number of clients served by 
the MFI.* 
Profit Margin: Net Operating Income / Financial Revenue* 
 Net Operating Income: Financial Revenue - (Financial Expense + 
Impairment Loss + Operating Expense) * 
 Financial Revenue: Revenues from the loan portfolio and from other 
financial assets are broken out separately and by type of income (interest, 
fee) * 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio: 
All outstanding principal for all outstanding client loans, including current, 
delinquent and restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off. 
It does not include interest receivable. It does not include employee loans. * 
Risk Coverage: Impairment Loss / (Portfolio at Risk > 30 days) * 
 Impairment Loss: The non-cash expense calculated as a percentage of the 
value of the loan portfolio that is at risk of default. This value is used to 
create or increase the impairment loss allowance on the balance sheet. * 
 Portfolio at Risk Greater than 30 Days: The value of all loans 
outstanding that have one or more installments of principal past due 
more than 30 days. This includes the entire unpaid principal balance, 
including both the past due and future installments, but not accrued 
interest. It also includes loans that have been restructured or rescheduled. 
* 
Operational Self 
Sufficiency (%): 
Financial Revenue / (Financial Expense + Impairment Loss + Operating 
Expense) * 
 Financial Revenue: Revenues from the loan portfolio and from other 
financial assets are broken out separately and by type of income (interest, 
fee) * 
 Financial Expense: These expenses will continue to be classified by 
associated liability, but are also broken down by type of expense 
(interest, fee) for each associated financial liability. * 
 Impairment Loss: The non-cash expense calculated as a percentage of the 
value of the loan portfolio that is at risk of default. This value is used to 
create or increase the impairment loss allowance on the balance sheet. * 
 Operating Expense: Expenses related to operations, including all 
personnel expense, depreciation and amortization, and administrative 
expense. * 
Years in 
Operation:  
The number of years in which an MFI has recorded operations, which was 
calculated by subtracting the year established from the years that data were 
submitted. Ɨ 
Number of Active 
Borrowers: 
The number of individuals or entities who currently have an outstanding 
loan balance with the MFI or are primarily responsible for repaying any 
portion of the Loan Portfolio, Gross. Individuals who have multiple loans 
with an MFI should be counted as a single borrower.  
Offices: The number of staffed points of service and administrative sites used to 
deliver or support the delivery of financial services to microfinance clients.  
Age:  MIX benchmark tables classify MFIs into three categories (new, young and 
mature) based on the maturity of their microfinance operations. This is 
calculated as the difference between the year they started their microfinance 
operations and the year of data submitted by the institutions. * 
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Variable Definition 
New 1 to 4 years 
Young 5 to 8 years 
Mature More than 8 years 
Scale* 
Small Africa, Asia, ECA, MENA: less than 2 million borrowers LAC: less than 4 million borrowers 
Medium Africa, Asia, ECA, MENA: 2 million – 8 million borrowers LAC: 4 million to 15 million borrowers 
Large Africa, Asia, ECA, MENA: greater than 8 million borrowers LAC: greater than 15 million borrowers 
Region* 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
(36 countries, 587 
MFIs) 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Congo, Republic of, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, The, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe Ɨ 
East Asia and the 
Pacific  
(13 countries, 292 
MFIs) 
Cambodia, China, People’s Republic of, East Timor, Fiji, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Thailand, Tonga, 
Vietnam Ɨ 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia  
(25 countries, 414 
MFIs) 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Ɨ 
Latin America and 
The Caribbean 
(25 countries, 502 
MFIs) 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, 
Suriname, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela Ɨ 
Middle East and 
North Africa  
(10 countries, 73 
MFIs) 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Yemen Ɨ 
South Asia  
(7 countries, 373 
MFIs) 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka Ɨ 
Regulated Ɨ 
Operations of the microfinance institution are regulated by a governing 
body in the formal banking system; this is designated in the data as a 
categorical variable and MFIs self-select “yes” or “no”. 
Profit Status Ɨ MFIs indicate if their charter designates their profit status as for-profit or not-for-profit (“profit” or “non-profit” categories in the data). 
Target Market * Indicates the depth of services provided by the MFI, where Depth equals the ratio of Average Loan Balance to corresponding the GNI per Capita  
Low End Depth <20% OR average loan size <USD 150 
Broad Depth between 20% and 149% 
High End Depth between 150% and 250% 
Small Business Depth over 250% 
*Definition provided by MixMarket. Ɨ Definition or tabulation provided by the author 
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Appendix D: Definitions of Country Level Variables 
Country Level Variable Definition 
World Bank Variables: 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 
GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as 
the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars. 
Mortality rate, children under-5 (per 1,000 live births)  Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
Real Interest Rate (%)  The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
Net Domestic Credit  The sum of net credit to the nonfinancial public sector, credit to the private sector, and other accounts. Data are in current local currency. 
Broad money (% of GDP)  
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money. They are the sum of currency and 
deposits in the central bank, plus transferable deposits and electronic currency, plus time 
and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and 
securities repurchase agreements, plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, 
commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of 
GDP)  
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on 
a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The 
banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other 
banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept 
transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). 
Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and 
building and loan associations. 
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Country Level Variable Definition 
PolityTM IV Project Variables:  
Institutionalized Democracy 
Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence 
of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences 
about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil 
liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other 
aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, 
freedom of the press, and so on are a means to, or specific manifestations of, these 
general principles.  
Regulation of Participation and Expression of Political 
Preferences 
Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and 
how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both 
regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling 
participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; 
the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for 
political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no 
enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political 
activity 
Competitiveness of Participation (degree of civil 
interaction) 
The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences 
for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. 
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Appendix E: Summary Statistics for Country Variables 
Country Variable: Region 
 Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and the Pacific 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
Latin America and 
The Caribbean 
Middle East and 
North Africa South Asia 
World Bank Variables: 
GDP per capita, PPP  
(constant 2005 
international $) 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
576 
1,449 
1,344 
247 
13,610 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
291 
3,387 
1,475 
859 
13,672 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
404 
7,589 
4,374 
968 
18,087 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
502 
7,160 
3,381 
992 
24,150 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
63 
4,556 
2,089 
1,612 
12,900 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
372 
2,027 
930 
568 
5,095 
Mortality rate, children 
under-5  
(per 1,000 live births)  
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
587 
117 
35 
41 
230 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
292 
34 
16 
6.5 
119 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
404 
29 
20 
5 
94 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
502 
28 
16 
8.7 
160 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
63 
36 
19 
9.3 
95 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
373 
66 
20 
12 
129 
Real Interest Rate (%)  
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
341 
11.54 
19.86 
-17.12 
508.74 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
269 
3.22 
3.62 
-15.68 
28.54 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
332 
5.72 
11.27 
-71.20 
97.47 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
480 
10.71 
10.78 
-18.90 
93.91 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
61 
5.83 
12.96 
-15.35 
66.27 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
370 
4.62 
4.51 
-6.82 
16.35 
Net Domestic Credit 
(scaled by $1,000,000) 
n:  
Mean: 
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
567 
1,638,224 
2,944,125 
-1,098,254 
1.69e^07 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
288 
4.55e^08 
7.90e^08 
-279 
3.06^e09 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
349 
2,949,153 
4,930,586 
200 
2.22e^07 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
502 
1.35e^07 
4.42e^07 
1,554 
2.55e^08 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
63 
4,674,719 
2.05e^07 
-2.57e^07 
1.05e^08 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
373 
1.64e^07 
2.02e^07 
-25,510 
6.65e^07 
Broad money (% of 
GDP) ** 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
567 
29.86 
12.37 
4.84 
151.55 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
287 
69.35 
43.61 
10.48 
180.78 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
356 
37.67 
16.46 
7.03 
83.30 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
502 
39.75 
13.42 
14.59 
97.87 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
63 
73.56 
47.93 
18.86 
238.56 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
373 
59.61 
14.67 
21.08 
80.66 
Domestic credit 
provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP)  
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
567 
26.21 
28.20 
-15.78 
196.08 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
287 
59.67 
38.99 
-31.83 
151.88 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
349 
32.99 
16.93 
5.56 
121.04 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
502 
42.69 
22.17 
10.51 
122.13 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
63 
73.56 
47.93 
-24.91 
191.17 
n:  
Mean:  
S.D.: 
Min: 
Max: 
373 
54.83 
15.37 
-4.41 
75.12 
**Zimbabwe in 2008 was excluded from this statistic as the value was recorded as 4,855,455,696,289,792 in the sample, which severely skewed the percentage.  
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Country Variable: Region 
 Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Latin America 
and The 
Caribbean 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
South Asia 
PolityTM IV Project Variables: 
Institutionalized Democracy Obs:  
n: 
794 
585 
Obs:  
n: 
325 
290 
Obs: 
n: 
550 
414 
Obs: 
 n: 
725 
498 
Obs:  
n:  
99 
63 
Obs:  
n: 
571 
373 
-88 37  17 18 1  
-77 31   7   
-66   16  14 18 
0 60 93 106  27 58 
1 83  46 7 33 29 
2 47 2 21  8 21 
3 37 18 20 10   
4 85 3 1 1 12 46 
5 51 2 128 57  158 
6 59 3 61 61  65 
7 144 29 36 155   
8 140 174 28 252 4  
9 20 1 55 130  175 
10   15 27   
Regulation of Participation and 
Expression of Political Preferences 
Obs: 
n: 
731 
585 
Obs:  
n: 
320 
290 
Obs: 
n: 
495 
414 
Obs: 
n: 
550 
498 
Obs: 
n: 
108 
63 
Obs: 
n: 
463 
373 
-88 37  17 18 1  
-77 31   7   
-66   16  14 18 
0       
1  2     
2 345 179 166 464 17 319 
3 270 48 220 29 60 101 
4 48 91 61  16 25 
5   15 32   
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Country Variable: Region 
 Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Latin America 
and The 
Caribbean 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
South Asia 
PolityTM IV Project Variables (continued): 
Competitiveness of Participation  
(degree of civil interaction) 
Obs: 
n: 
715 
585 
Obs: 
n: 
297 
290 
Obs: 
n: 
466 
414 
Obs:  
n: 
587 
 498 
Obs:  
n: 
101 
63 
Obs:  
n: 
514 
373 
-88 37  17 18 1  
-77 31   17   
-66   16  14 18 
0 73 4 21  11 3 
1 1 91 33  3  
2 75 3 73  22 58 
3 189 6 101 187 42 164 
4 309 193 190 343 8 271 
5   15 32   
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